Remembering the ‘Day of Treachery’ and Its Implications

By Maulana Bobby Alonto

Brother Al Haj Murad Ebrahim, Chairman of the MILF and Amirul Mujahideen, is right in designating February 11 as the ‘Day of Treachery’.

This is to remind the Bangsamoro people of what had happened on that fateful day of February 11, 2003, which is six years ago, when the Armed Forces of the Philippines, without rhyme or reason, suddenly unleashed an indiscriminate and devastating barrage of artillery and mortar fire on the Islamic Center at the Buliok Complex in Pagalungan, Maguindanao. The Islamic Center was the temporary ‘residence’ of Sheikh Salamat Hashim, the late Chairman of the MILF and Amirul Mujahideen, from where he also received visitors from all corners of the Bangsamoro Homeland and from all over the world after the ‘capture’ of Camp Abubakr as-Siddiq in 2000. The bombardment took place while the Islamic faithful were gathered in the mosque for the early morning congregational prayer to begin the celebration of ‘Id’l Adha, the end of Hajj, one of the two major Islamic religious holidays observed by Muslims worldwide.

To recall, it was Sheikh Salamat Hashim, who was delivering the khutbah, the ‘Id prayer sermon, when the artillery barrage commenced and shells from the AFP’s heavy cannons and mortars began exploding all over the Islamic Center and its vicinity. Undaunted, the Sheikh and the Muslim faithful in the mosque remained inside until the prayers, invocations and khutbah were over.

But the artillery barrage of the AFP was only a prelude to a massive ground attack by Filipino infantry formations and armored units on MILF forces in the Buliok complex and in all other fronts. This attack inaugurated the second all-out war that saw nearly 800,000 Moro civilians, majority of them women and children, being driven out of their homes and into refugee centers scattered all over Central Mindanao. Senator Aquilino Pimentel, Jr., however, would state several months after the attack that the number of refugees would reach almost the million mark.

Retrospectively, the attack on Buliok was a calculated operation of the Philippine government hatched in the backroom of Malacañang to eliminate the MILF leadership so as to permanently disable the Moro liberation movement.

It also had economic implications. Buliok complex is located at the Liguasan marsh which is at the heart of the Cotabato Basin where natural gas and, most likely, petroleum have been discovered to abound in massive quantity. Significantly, this resource-rich area is under the control of the MILF, thus preventing the Philippine government, its predatory foreign transnational partners and the local Filipino political-cum-economic vested-interest groups in Mindanao from exploiting its natural wealth for their own benefit. A war to eject the MILF from the Liguasan was thus seen as the most expedient way to clear the area of any impediment to the exploitation of these natural resources rightly owned since time immemorial by the Maguindanaon Moros in particular and the Bangsamoro nation in general.

The timing was also right. Or so it seemed. The attack on the United States by ‘suicide bombers’ on September 11, 2001 had brought about the reconfiguration of attitudes and foreign policies of governments in the West and their allied regimes in the Third World. The so-called war on terror that the US, under George W. Bush, was to lead created a bandwagon among subservient regimes whose twin motives were to serve the imperial interests of the US and the West as well as use this opportunity to militarily crush legitimate liberation movements in their own backyards. And this, precisely, is what to my mind prompted the Arroyo regime to change course at that moment and attempt to ‘hit many birds with one stone’ when it veered away from the negotiating table, discarded its ceasefire agreement with the MILF, and launched its military adventure in Mindanao. With ‘Big Brother’, the US, at its back, the regime thought it could drop the peace talks with legitimate revolutionary movements by classifying them as ‘terrorists’ and then fight a war it knew it could never win on its own.

But even that was a miscalculation, a misreading of historical factors, deeply-entrenched sentiments and current trends as later developments would prove. For the aspiration of oppressed peoples and captive nations to be free can never be suppressed or defeated. The equation in conflicts brought about by the antagonism between state actors and liberation movements is such that the greater the repression, the greater the resistance. And this the Arroyo regime would find out soon enough when it foolishly unleashed the 2003 all-out war on the MILF and the Bangsamoro people.

Unknown to the public at large, the attack on Buliok was launched not only on an Islamic holiday; it was also done while preparations were being made by the MILF for the resumption of the peace negotiation with the Philippine government, which, under the Arroyo regime, was restarted in 2001 after it was suspended in 2000 as a result of the Estrada all-out-war. After the assumption to power of Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo through a ‘people power revolt’ that cut short the term of Joseph Estrada, peace talks with the MILF were resumed with Malaysia and, for a while Libya, as third party facilitators.

During the preliminary talks prior to the formal negotiation in Tripoli (Libya), a Philippine government emissary, Eduardo Ermita, told the MILF representatives in Kuala Lumpur that never again would an ‘all-out war’ happen under the watch of Arroyo. But less than two years after Ermita uttered those words, the Buliok attack happened which subsequently triggered another all-out war. And this occurred while another round of peace talks was supposedly scheduled the following week after ‘Id’l Adha, the day of the aggression.

Indeed, if this was not an act of treachery, it would be difficult, if not well-nigh impossible, to define what an act of treachery is.
At the height of the Philippine military aggression, an insider in the Philippine government confidentially disclosed to some Muslims that in one of the many meetings called by President Arroyo in Malacañang with top honchos of the military establishment, she berated these officials for having failed to get Sheikh Salamat Hashim “dead or alive”. This insider vividly described Arroyo as near hysterical in her rage; accordingly, shouting at the top of her voice she repeated her orders to the military officials present to spare no effort to kill Sheikh Salamat at all cost or by hook or by crook.

I am not presuming to know if this disclosure were a hundred percent reliable. But one thing certain is that Sheikh Salamat was declared by the government and the military a “high-value target” as documentary evidence would later show. And this amounted to pretty much the same thing that the insider said was what Arroyo ordered her military commanders in the AFP to accomplish with respect to the physical elimination of Sheikh Salamat. Whatever it is, though, I am positively certain that the declaration of Sheikh Salamat as “high-value target” would have had the clearance of the highest authority in the Philippine nation-state.

In any event, this act of treachery, while peace talks were still on with the MILF, would impact greatly on the economic, and consequentially political, stability of the Arroyo regime. Already debilitated by entrenched corruption in all levels and institutions of government, the Arroyo regime would reel back from a guerrilla war that the MILF had relentlessly waged at that time in defense of its territories and its mass-based organized communities erroneously called ‘camps’ by the Philippine military. Much to the consternation of the government and the military, this guerrilla war could not be contained in a particular locale; on the contrary, it affected, directly or indirectly, almost all areas of Mindanao and Sulu.

In a report submitted to the 10th Session of the OIC Islamic Summit Meeting in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, on October 11-18, 2003, the MILF Central Committee stated, among others, that five regions in Mindanao were affected by the war: ARMM, Region IX, Region XI, Region X, Region XI and Region XII. In other words, the conflict covered 12 provinces, 5 cities, 74 municipalities, and 342 barangays.

The immediate result of this was that six months after it had exuberantly embarked on its military adventurism in Mindanao in February 11 the Arroyo regime had to return, like a humbled whimpering canine with its tail between its legs, to the negotiating table with the MILF. Had it not done so, it would have gone the way of the disgraced Estrada regime whose previous all-out war against the Bangsamoro people and the MILF had weakened it to such an extent that it became vulnerable to a military-civilian coup d’état euphemistically called ‘people power revolution’.

However, the Bangsamoro people and the MILF, too, would emerge from the effects of February 11 without being unscathed. Apart from the massive devastation of Moro communities and the deaths of hundreds of people insufficiently documented because of the viciousness of the war, the Bangsamoro people and the MILF lost their greatest mujahid leader of the time – Sheikh Salamat Hashim.

Reminiscing on those fateful events, one can hardly maintain control of one’s emotions because those were truly emotional moments. When Buliok was placed under siege by the AFP, Ustadz Salamat stubbornly refused to vacate the Islamic Center. Friends, brothers-in-arms and relatives alike appealed to him to withdraw to a secured area, but all these were in vain. The Sheikh was prepared to stand, fight and die as a Shahid (martyr in a state of jihaad). It took the convincing and persistent arguments of then MILF Central Committee Vice-Chairman Al Haj Murad Ebrahim to persuade him to seek safety in a more secured area, and it was only then that the late Sheikh agreed to move to the jungle fastness of Lanao del Sur where he would continue to conduct the MILF’s guerrilla war of resistance against the military aggression of the sitting Filipino regime.

The perilous journey of Sheikh Salamat to Lanao del Sur is a thrilling story very much like a movie plot that in itself needs to be told at the appropriate time. This writer and several other brothers contributed in a humble way to the successful and safe entry of the Sheikh into Lanao del Sur where he finally returned to the Mercy of his Lord and Creator several months later due to a lingering heart ailment exacerbated by harsh living conditions.

It was in the mountains of Lanao del Sur that I (as with other members of the MILF peace panel and the MILF Chairman’s staff) personally witnessed the incredible jihadi revolutionary patience, perseverance and sacrifices of the late Sheikh Salamat in the face of the intense military manhunt mounted against him by the Philippine government and the terrific deprivation that he was subjected to. All told, this took a fatal toll on his already weakened health that finally led to his death on July 13, 2003.

The demise of Sheikh Salamat Hashim indeed placed the whole Bangsamoro nation in a state of grief. The loss was felt by the humblest Moro peasant fighter of the MILF in the countryside of the Moro homeland. It reverberated to foreign shores where Moro expatriates, Muslim and Arab leaders and revolutionaries of the global Islamic movement alike mourned his death. But, it also shattered a myth – a myth that the Philippine government had been trying to make the public believe: that his death would lead to a leadership crisis inside the MILF, resulting in its disintegration.

But to the surprise and dismay of all who were expecting that the MILF would crumble because of power struggle after the physical exit of the Sheikh, the MILF emerged more united and organized contrary to what was anticipated by the enemies of the Bangsamoro Revolution. The smooth transition to the MILF chairmanship of Al Haj Murad Ebrahim and the manner by which he was elected by the MILF collective leadership to this position disproved once and for all the preconceived notion that the MILF was only good while Sheikh Salamat was alive.

The ascendance of Al Haj Murad, a veteran Moro mujahideen leader, a committed revolutionary and a skilled diplomat, to the MILF chairmanship which was welcomed by the rank and file of the MILF and the Bangsamoro people proved yet again the resiliency of the MILF not only in times of military adversities but in periods of political and organizational difficulties. This resiliency demonstrated even to the enemies of the Bangsamoro Revolution who were forced to accept and admit, albeit grudgingly, even in their public declarations that the MILF is indeed an Islamic ideological revolutionary movement incomparable to the MNLF.

In ideological revolutionary movements, leadership styles may differ as one leader is replaced by another for whatever reasons. Each leader has a unique way of managing the affairs of the movement. But, what remains constant is principled policy because such is reflective of the ideology of the organization. This is demonstrated in the revolutionary dynamics of consultation (shurah) within the MILF, which is an inherent mechanism in Islam that allows for the translation of ideological principles into concrete policies whether by an Islamic revolutionary government and state or a movement.

Ustadz Salamat Hashim, when he was alive, believed that a negotiated political settlement is the most practical and civilized way to resolve the Bangsamoro problem without, however, derogating the central role of armed jihaad in the liberation struggle as the principal mode to defend the Bangsamoro people from colonialist aggression, repression and oppression by the Philippine nation-state.

This belief is not without any basis in the Qur’an al-Kareem, the Sunnah and the Seerah of the Holy Prophet of Islam (saw). In short, both armed struggle and peace negotiation find endorsement in Islam. The Prophet (saw) used both means to complement each other as evidenced by the battles he fought and the peace pacts he entered into with the hostile jahiliyyah tribes of Arabia, the most prominent of which was the Treaty of Hudaibiya which he concluded with the numero uno enemy of the Muslims at that time, the pagan Quraishi ruling class of Makkah.
That said, when Sheikh Salamat presented the idea of a negotiated political settlement of the Bangsamoro Problem, it was a natural consequence of the Islamic ideology to which he, not to mention the entire leadership of the MILF, adhered. It is, therefore, not surprising that such a belief would be translated into a principled policy of the MILF which its present post-Salamat leadership under Al Haj Murad would continue and uphold to this day.

The consistency with which the MILF has shown by holding on to the policy of a negotiated political settlement of the Bangsamoro problem despite the erratic behavior of the Philippine government in and out of the negotiating table illustrates the ideological-cum-political maturity of the MILF leadership. This ideological-cum-political maturity does not have any room for arbitrariness.

I believe that this policy consistency is what has unfolded before the very eyes of the international community, including the OIC, in the course of events after February 11, 2003, which explains why it views the MILF with more understanding and sympathy as never before. For, it was this policy consistency that the MILF demonstrated when it remained devoted to the peace process in the face of the aborted MOA-AD signing after 11 long years of painstaking negotiations trying to find a compromise formula to end the conflict in Mindanao and Sulu. It was this policy consistency that the MILF also displayed when it did not disband its panel of negotiators even as the Philippine government capriciously abandoned the negotiations by scuttling its peace panel in favor of another round of destructive offensive war in Mindanao. And, it was also this policy consistency that by and large restrained the MILF from responding in kind to the consuming war that the war hawks in the AFP wanted to draw the MILF into. The most that the MILF did was to adopt a defensive posture in the light of the aggressive and repressive nature of the wide-scale military operations that the AFP is currently conducting against MILF ground forces and Moro mass-based organized communities.

February 11, 2003, the ‘Day of Treachery’, will indeed be forever etched in the memory of our oppressed people and nation. Not only because that ‘black day’ unveiled to our people the blatant perfidiousness of the Philippine colonialist rulers of our occupied Moro homeland but, on the positive side, it also taught us lessons in patience, perseverance and sacrifice in the face of a mendacious adversary.

Indeed, the Qur’an, as always, speaks the truth when it said in effect that those who are patient and vie with one another for constancy shall be rewarded by Allah subhanahu wa ta’ala with success.

We lost a great mujahid leader, the Imam of the Bangsamoro nation, in the person of Sheikh Salamat Hashim as a result of February 11, 2003. But in return, we gained a new Amir of the Bangsamoro nation, Al Haj Murad Ebrahim, who is a devoted and loyal ‘student’ of the Sheikh and therefore a leader equal to the task that the late MILF founder had left behind. On top of that, we have learned to value and practice the patience, perseverance, sacrifice and constancy which the Sheikh, in his lifetime, epitomized.

And because of that, we have matured.

We shall never forget 2/11, the ‘Day of Treachery’, particularly at this time when again the true colors of Philippine colonialism are coming out into the fore. Neither should this be forgotten by the next generation of Moros whose vision-mission is to bring to fruition the Bangsamoro nation’s struggle for the right of self-determination and freedom.