Muslim-Christian Relations in the Philippines: Redefining the Conflict

Written by Prof. Datu Amilusin A. Jumaani
28 October 2000

My Brothers and Sisters in Humanity
My Brothers and Sisters in Islam
Distinguished Peace Builders

About a couple of months ago, relations between the Muslims and the Christians in the Philippines have once again been provoked into a confrontational stance with the problem over the Moro Islamic Liberation Front’s (MILF) armed movement for an independent Islamic state in the South and the audacity of the Abu Sayyaf for hostage rampage. While these may seem to be a problem on peace and order, the side effects of an economy on a downturn, they nonetheless trigger an alarm that it is not “all quiet at the southern front” to borrow a line. This means, something of the disturbing part of the past is being disturbed once more. What is again being stirred murky is the regard of the Muslims against the Christian Filipinos and vice-versa.
The recidivism in the Muslim-Christian encounter in the country has raised a major question whether the solution or the line of action taken to resolve the so called “Muslim problem” is tenable or not. In this respect, the national leadership as well as the other power blocs believe that whatever infirmity or shortcomings there are in the solution, that is, the 1996 Peace Agreement between the Philippine Government and the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) particularly on the establishment and operation of autonomy in Muslim Mindanao, is mainly a matter of effective management. It is understandable why the central administration of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) has been pressured to answer serious allegations on irregularities in handling development funds and other financial assistance for reconstruction and rehabilitation.

The government is strongly cloaked with political as well as moral authority to place the ARMM Governor under a compromising position, himself, having been a principal signatory to the 1996 Peace Agreement, and to a greater extent, the 1996 Peace Agreement is a carefully worked-out solution binding and perfect; that whatever “failures” or discontentment that would arise is solely a question of the efficiency and effectivity of the discharge of administrative function and responsibility.

It is common knowledge that the Muslim problem in the Philippines dates back to colonial times of the 16th Century of the Spanish Conquistadors. In between the episodes of more than three hundred years of warfare, peace treaties were made and more frequently so as the colonialo rule drew closer to an end. So was the case with the succeeding American occupation and in the period of Philippine Independence from 1945 to the present. In all, treaties were nothing but a military strategy to bring temporary lull to the massive toll in lives and properties only to resume in greater intensity of casualties and reinforcing the antagonism deeper in history.
Quite regrettably, the present situation is caught in the perpetuation of the conditions and circumstances of the past conflicts. If ever there is a point of difference between the past and present experience, it is mainly on the change in background scene but not in the perception, understanding, approach and method in addressing the problem.

Certainly, humanity is celebrating the era of globalization that harks upon a universal embrace of the ideals of democracy, of humanization, and of self-determination. Nothing could be more appealing and persuasive than to consider the Muslim problem in the context of these ideals. Thus, armed with these hallmarks of contemporary or advanced civility, the national leadership endorsed the problem to the “people” who, in turn, must also have the final work in accepting or rejecting the solution. Such was the fate of the Organic Act for the establishment of the autonomous region in Muslim Mindanao and the 1996 Peace Agreement. And such is the way it would be defended in rationalizing any extreme measures designed to effect the pacification of the South. In a dictum, the people have spoken with the divine will - vox populi, vox dei.
Countries in Asia, Africa, the Middle East, and the Americans have their own tale, their heroes in the course of their struggle to regain their independence from Western powers. Throughout the colonial period, the policy of aggression and the machinery of conquest reached the limit of what cruelty could inflict because it was morally right, because it was the responsibility of the materially advanced Western societies to “civilize” these parts of the human race who seemed to have defied the law of social evolution. There was no voice of the people to be heeded at that time, just the thundering guns and shrewd diplomacy to forge a document of outright victory and of surrender. Military officers and political figures stood tall to take the credits for citation as well as for the judgement of history. It was a time when individuals were prepared to answer for their actions. Today, who is there of the “people” to bear the responsibility or take the blame? None. Because supra-collective sin or crime is unthinkable. Therefore, the “people” are right and those who go against the people are necessarily wrong. Such is what is happening now.
The Muslim problem in the Philippines articulates substantially how the dominance and superiority of the Christianized majority could be rationalized as presented earlier. There is no equivocation on this as the roots of the conflict situation explain how the coutnry was anointed to inherit the colonial cultures, perpetuating its perception and attitudes towards the centuries-old adversary of its Spanish master from thereon. It is thus irony to claim the Organic Act on Muslim Mindanao and the 1996 Peace Agreement as solutions whereby they simply disguise or rationalize a state of colonial relations. Both the constitutional provision on autonomy and the mechanics of implementation incorporated in the 1996 Peace Agreement are mere overlay of the national bureaucracy. What seems to be the “autonomous” feature of this agreement is that Muslims are employed in key positions as well as the rank and file of agencies of the government. But even the manpower requirements of the ARMM are not 100% recruited from the Muslim population; non-Muslim (Christians) are given the privilege to occupy high-level positions as is the case of the Special Zone of Peace and Development (SZOPAD) which is equally composed of non-Muslims in its highest policy-making body. The supposed “special” status of the autonomous regional government is illusory, considering that major bureaucratic functions are already devolved to local government units throughout the country.

What can be gleaned from the structure and operations of the ARMM and the SZOPAD is that it provides the Muslims the opportunity to run the machinery of government, the very mode in which they are kept from realizing their aspiratins as a distinct segment in the national polity. In effect, autonomy is an instrument through which the Muslims are conscripted to further legitimize the so-called colonial relationship. Lured by the prospects of good life, a deliverance from poverty and the miseries of war, it is consequential to have them fighting out for positions in the autonomous government and its subsidiary agencies. On the other hand, the government is keen on institutionalizing autonomy by expanding its territorial scope from the existing four provinces (Lanao del Sur, Sultan Kudarat, Sulu, and Tawi-Tawi) to a number that would somehow impress its commitment to the earlier Tripoli Accord on the composition of the autonomous region of 13 provinces.

As has been noted, there is little change, if at all, in the perception and understanding of the Muslim problem. This is true to both parties in the conflict. Nevertheless, since the Philippine government is run by the majority and has the resources at its disposal to effect any policy or strategy to seriously resolve the issue, the burden weighs heavily on its side. Time and again there has always been an emphasis on sincerity in the peace negotiations and the insistence upon genuine autonomy. Whatever or however this may be interpreted, it lays down a premise that sincerity and genuineness are left to be desired.

In Defense of Territorial Integrity and Sovereignty

What the past and present Philippine political leadership, or the Filipinos in general, have been duty bound to uphold is the territorial integrity of the country and sovereignty. This is, of course, the preamble of every state or nation. There is no challenge or trouble if the citizenry is homogenous. But where a part of the state is alientated it, too, invokes the same principle of territorial dominion and sovereignty. Such is the case with the Muslims in the Philippines whose history has taken a different and divergent route from the rest of the Filipinos. The facts are established in the long list of the so-called “Moro wars” fought fiercely and persistently by the Muslims to stave off colonial agression, in contrast to the resignation of the native inhabitants of Luzon and the Visayas to foreign rule. In the process, the Muslims retained their faith and culture while the Filipinos were absorbed into religious and cultural western mould. As it were, the flow of Philippine history diverged into two rivers, each seeking its own path, each fulfilling its journey towards a particular destiny.

The American occupaton of the Philippines defined and ensured its territory and its sovereignty and the instrumentalities of government that would render then form and substance. Despite the trappings of a modern state, however, the country is internally divided between North and South, between Muslim and Christians. The conflict in Southern Philippines the past three decades is suggestively conclusive that territorial integrity does not make a nation and no sovereignty is absolute.

The intrasigence on the territorial integrity of the country, archipelagic as it is, greatly influenced government policy and programs towards the Muslims. Filipinization and later on national integration became popular bywords. Although there had been some degree of modification and adjustment made after one failure to another, the bottom line has always been the idealism on one undivided country - Isang Bansa, Isang Diwa (One country, One Spirit). The autonomous government for Muslim areas in the south is expressive of how far the government has seriously attempted at fixing permanently the concept of territorial integrity. This need be so as a sine-qua-non to complementary programs that would draw the Muslims into the mainstream of body politic with the rest of the Filipinos. As with the previous programs on national integration, the establishment of autonomous region for Muslim areas is seemingly having difficulty in terms of administrative operations and the dramatic popular acceptability in which the national referendum for the Organic Act on Autonomy for Muslim Mindanao was designed to generate. Following the foregoing argument, autonomy is a political solution to guarantee the territorial integrity of the country as against the imperatives of self-determination.

There is a strong psychological barrier in coming up with a redefinition of territorial integrity in the conflict situation. The concept itself is the crux of the problem and is a byproduct of colonial rule. The physical factor of geography requires a singularity of elements that make up a society; thus, one country, one citizenship, one law, one language, etc. It thus became an imposed necessity where by rationalization or justification could be made on actions tha tmay likely be in violation of human rights. The consequences of this perception are evident in the present conflict in Mindanao and even earlier on.

By redefinition, a point is being raised whether the survival of the country means first and foremost territorial integrity, or should that integrity be more relevant and constructive in the context of social solidarity? By nature’s incomprehensible workings, the Philippines is fragmented into 7,000 islands, a physical feature that is definite and permanent, nurturing in turn distinct markings of tribes, languages, cultures, etc. whose diversity and distance is beyond reach of legislated laws and bureaucratic policies. Where the inhabitants feel, however, that they have something valuable to share and cherish, the deep divided is a matter of crossing over.
The Homeland: Birthright and the receding domain.

In the impasse on the territorial question on the areas of Muslim autonomy in the construct of the Tripoli Agreement, the American definition of the Moro province, that is, the 13 provinces was finally accepted as basis. Nevertheless, the Moro domain as expressed in the said agreement was never implemented nor the agreement itself; instead, it was further reduced into an insignificant size with only 4 of the 13 provinces finally adopted as the true area of autonomy in the Organic Act for Muslim Autonomy. This was, of course, determined by a referendum and thus became a basis for determining where Muslims form the majority of the population. This also proved that the Muslims have been misled to think that they have a right over the 13 provinces as initially stated in the Tripoli Agreement. There was a good reason to discredit the American survey, as its rule is long past gone. And as the problem is current, then the factor of population must be established within the proper time frame.

The Moro Province of the American administration encompassed the areas that were identified to be either major Muslim settlement6s or where their control have thus extended at the time when the Philippine population is still polarized into two major groupings - the Moros and the Indios (the Christianized Filipinos). It was the Moro Province as the Americans assessed and accurately the distinct history, culture, and religious beliefs of hte people in stark contrast to the larger Filipino community. The Americans even considered of having a special status for the Moro Province under their stewardship in the event of the granting of independence to the Filipinos, fearing that a time will come when there would be bloodshed. The Americans were right all along.

With the granting of independence of the Filipinos, the demography of the Moro Province was increasingly altered by the unabated influx of settlers from Luzon and the Visayas. Until today, domestic migration contines as the prospects of a better life in the so-called “Land of Promise” are there, providing an alternative to the growing poverty in most of the Christian areas. The “Land of Promise” was actually a campaign slogan for populating the vast areas of the Moro Province with non-native inhabitants. In a matter of 50 years, the once large Muslim provinces of Cotabato, Lanao, Davao, Zamboanga Peninsula, and Basilan are now inhabited mostly by Christians.

The systematic and deliberate resettlement program of the government in Muslim areas is nothing less than a classic colonial strategy - that of colonization by settlement. This is but necessary in fixing the concept of territorial integrity and that of sovereignty residing in the people. The resettlement program was reinforced by the involvement of the Church, the presence of military forces, and the economic support provided by both private and public financial institutions as well as the organizational resources of non-government entities. The Muslims were left to tend to themselves. Poor and mostly uneducated, they lost their precious lands whose ownership stands on tradition as against documents now in the hands of the settlers. Dispossessed and economically maimed, the natives of Moroland find themselves reliving the conflict they have known all their lives against foreign incursions. The “enemy” now may no longer be the “white men”, but they are seen as having the saving purpose of subjugating them under a law and a culture they have fought for more than three hundred years.

The Media: Objectivity vs. Propaganda

Prejudices and discrimination between the Muslims and the Christianshave been ingrained as permanent as a birthmark. Calling the Muslims as Moros was an effective means in rallying the Filipinos to fight on the side of the Spaniards in their military campaigns against the former. So was the labeling of the Christianized Filipinos as Bisaya (meaning, slaves) by the Moros. Little has improved in the way the two communities regard each other with derision and contempt up to today. Nonetheless, there had been attempts at improving the situation prompted by the aggravating conflict in the 70s. Information dissemination was intensively carried out through the media run on Muslim history, culture, and religion, and a number of scholarly studies in explaining the forces that contributed to Muslim-Christian misunderstandings. Institutional programs were also undertaken such as the construction of a Muslim community (mostly Muslim professionals) in Manila, mosques, special schools on Islamic Studies, an Islamic Bank (Amanah Bank), and the Ministry for Muslim Affairs. Information campaign and education proved to be quite effective in easing the tension especially on the part of the Muslims who saw some degree of restitution in the government for its longstanding neglect and discriminatino.
As the conflict began to gradually lull and subside, the enthusiasm on almost all of these programs consequently waned. The housing projects for Muslims lost their exclusivity, the Ministry was cut down to size to a mere office, and interests on Islamic culture and tradition no longer qualified for research and other scholarly studies. All these are presumed to be now under the responsibility of in fact the very purpose of establishing the ARMM. The deep-seated misunderstanding requires the greater involvement of the country’s entire population. In a sense, it is a national concern rather than just a regional one.

How the prejudices and discrimination are dyed fast in the national fabric is pretty much evident in the way the words Muslim and Islam have been used, as there are events or issues that directly bear upon the Muslims, individually or collectively. The caution that was raised in the indiscriminate use of the word Muslim or Islam in media reports and other write-ups is now being abandoned. The stereotype concepts on Muslim and Islam are once again reinforced as the media tell tales of the encounters with the MILF and the Abu Sayyaf. Extremist, fundamentalist, secessionist, rebel, lost command, gangster, terrorist, smuggler, hold-upper, kidnapper are prefixed with the word Muslim or Islam, projecting the Muslims all the more as unreasonable, barbaric and violent. Whether this is a deliberate and conscious act or not, it is clear to have a presumption that there is a hint at a sloganeering or labeling to rally once again the Christians against the Muslims with regard to the outbreak of hostilities in Muslim Mindanao between the armed forces and the Muslim groups. In the South, another chapter in the history of conflict unfolds in resurrection.

Media’s persuasive power is most efficient and effective in creating a collective consciousness and action. It would be taking a great deal of risks not to have control of the mass media, or at least some measure of censorship, in as far as the conflict in Southern Philippines is concerned. As the media are in the hands of the Christians and some of them are practically owned by the government or have investments of the church and other Christian religious groups, it logically explains why mass media are out with suggestive derogatory use of Muslim and Islam in the headlines and the stories.

It may be said that the Philippine media are acting out of bounds. It is to be pointed out, however, that the responsibility is directed towards the national majority, not the minority. As has been mentioned, the Philippine political leadership stands on its policy to integrate the Muslims into the mainstream of Filipino life. It need not be stated, but the responsibility of the media is to see to it that the process of integration could serve its end. What happens next follows what have been earlier on premised. It can be a vicious cycle unless a radical perception of Muslim-Christian relations in the country could be initiated and sustained.
Concluding Remarks

A noted Muslim Filipino historian, Dr. Cesar Adib Majul, in his major work, “The Muslims in the Philippines”, puts forward an idea on the phenomenon of “juramentado”, loosely translated as “running amock” in the perception of the Spaniards and the Americans, respectively, as an act of sacrifice in defense of Islam and the community of faithfuls.

Towards the close of the 19th Century, the Sultanates (the political institution of the Muslims in the Philippines) were considerably weakened by the long-drawn wars and were hardly in a position to keep up with the defenses against foreign incursions. There were compromises and concessions at this ebbing point that were regarded by the people as an abandonment of the responsibility on the part of the sultan to protect the community. It then became an individual obligation to ward off the presence of the foreigners and in most cases it ended up with a personal appointment with death, something that is believed to be recompensed with paradise for facing up to the agression of the non-believers. Quite a number of these juramentados became legendary, inspiring each generation on what it takes to have faith and to remain faithful to history.

The juramentado phenomenon waned in time and the Americans pursued an education campaign for the Muslims. They believed that through education a change could be expected from the Muslims, that is, pacified in the manner the rest of the Filipinos were successfully molded in the ways of western culture. The members of the royalty were the principal targest of the American educational campaign. Pangian Tarhata Kiram, a princess and heir to the Sulu Sultanate, was sent to the United States for schooling. In the United States she was fashioned as an American as she could be. When she came home, she spat the bubble gum and again picked up the habit of chewing bettle nut. It did seem to the princess that to swallow the ways of the “white men” was to betray her own roots.

In the changing economic, political and social structure brought about by the dominance of the Filipino order, the Muslims were gradually encouraged to get an education as a survival measure. The Philippine government seized the opportunity and intensified its programs on educating the Muslims especially in granting scholarships and other incentive benefits. While children of most of the well-to-do families enrolled in this program, majority of the poor population kept out of school. However, no sooner, attration to education reached its point of dissatisfaction. Some Muslim intellectuals and political leaders had uneasiness over the contents of the curriculum, suspicious above all of what harm it could inflict on the coming generations as to their existence and identity, and above all, their being Muslims.

Where the institution of the juramentado provided a cross-over in the defense of the Muslim communities after the demise of the sultanate, the birth of the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) may be regarded as a cross-over of the former. In summary, the MNLF’s peace negotiation with the Philippine government triggered a successive line of crossover defense with the declaration of “jihad” by the MILF and the yet confused but real threat of the Abu Sayyaf. The pattern of resistance that has emerged from the centuries of conflict may became all the more visibly clear in the future given the consistency in the perception and understanding of the problem. The events following the disintegration of Russia and Yugoslavia put in parallel perspective the context within which the Muslim situation in the Philippines could take a turn.
Consistently, the prevailing view on the Muslim problem is influenced by dominant modern day thoughts on economics wherein human existence is subjected to pure function of material progress. The establishment of the ARMM, the SZOPAD, the integration of former MNLF forces into the Philippine Armed Forces, are directed towards teh quantified satisfaction of a problem that has antedated contemporary governments and lifestyles.

Though the pangs of poverty contribute to social unrest, there is still much to human aspirations aside from basic needs for survival. This is a crucial point in which the Muslim communities in the Philippines have been struggling to strike a balance between the “passions of the earth and the desires of heaven”, so to speak. Every amount of rehabilitation and reconstruction funds for the development of Muslim Mindanao has come to naught in pacifying the conflict situation for the simple reason of lack of appreciation of the Weltanschauung of the Muslims by the national polity.

The quantified understanding of life is insisted by virtue of its being functional to the majority, that is, the larger Christian population. The saying, “a sauce for the goose is the sauce for the gander” appears to be the solution relentlessly pursued since it logically fits into the mold of what constitutes territorial integrity, the meaning of sovereignty, the supremacy of the constitution, one language to stand for a nation, and the definition of democracy as a rule by the majority.

Majority-Minority: Setting the right equation

It is to be noted that in the 1996 Peace Agreement, in the operations of the SZOPAD, in the socio-economic upliftment of the Southern Philippines, the thrusts of government programs and projects and those of donor countries encompass the non-Muslims (Christians that include the Lumads - natives). It is to be noted, too, that the conflict in the South concerns the plight of the Muslims who have been long neglected and long been discriminated. In short, this is a minority problem. It is thus to be treated as such in a manner that the solution addresses primarily the concerns of the Muslims without prejudice to the Christians in the area who already belong to the majority in the first place. It is a situation in which the majority (the national government) is offering assistance to the minority not only in terms of development projects but more importantly the means and the opportunities for empowerment to rise to the level of competitiveness with the majority. In a sense, it is to establish a right equation in the majority-minority relationship. Sadly, this is not what is happening in the South: the equation is kept lopsided. So the problem persists more to the liking of the solutions being undertaken. One Muslim Filipino writer puts this in a perspective: “The development and peace for Muslim is an offering, a gift by the majority to the minority: it is in bad taste when the majority still gets a share of its own gift.”

For the moment, the country’s political leadership disallows any change or modification in what it perceives as a “dismemberment” of the Philippine Republic. As if this is not enough, it imposes homogeneity of the Filipinos as a nation in spite of the existence of multi-cultural and multi-religious communities, which altogether prove the contrary. Nowhere does this come closer to the truth with the plight of the Muslims.

Given the position and the disposition of the Philippine government vis-a-vis the Muslims in the country, the present conflict in Muslim Mindanao is essentially a direct statement on how colonial relations have persisted into the modern times. The claim of the Muslim political groups for independence could only be the most viable option to break away from such a relationship. On the one hand, the acceptance of the Muslim political leadership, particularly the MNLF, and the ongoing peace negotiations with the MILF for autonomy is strongly indicative of how they could allow their existence within the territorial integrity of the country provided they exercise control over their lives as well as their destiny. Thus, independence is perceived by the Muslims as a matter of substance in opposition to the government’s political definition of it, that is, the existence of another state.

There are a number of governments that have intermittently confronted problems on minorities and have resolved or contained them in the course of time. But where there is the problem on Muslims as the minority, the issue dies hard. Not only does the problem involve religious sensitivities but more importantly on the reconciliation of two systems of law – one that is secular oriented and the other immutably sacred. And in the Philippine situation, the meaning of territorial integrity and sovereignty leaves no room for another system of law such as the Shari’ah. Just like autonomy, the incorporation of the Muslim Personal and Family Law into the Philippine Law serves only to reinforce the sovereignty of the latter. This is the main point of conflict, and resiliency of both sides could only serve to induce and sustain a breaking point with violence.

Altering the Equation: Encounter of Civilizations

During the height of the Muslim armed struggle under the Marcos era, a part of the major counter-insurgency steps taken was the acknowledgement of Islam as national heritage, an indispensable element in the search for national identity and nation-building. There was likewise a heightened consciousness regarding the Muslims not just as mere numerical entities but warmly qualified as being significant minority. What could have been a fresh look at Muslim-Christian relationships was marred by the fact that the advocate of such a radical view was no less unacceptable than the idea itself. It was all too difficult to go along with the policy Marcos was espousing at that time, as he was having an acute contradiction in his delusions to hold on to power. Besides, while the recognition of Islam and the role of Muslims in Philippine history, past and present, stood on good merits, they were only good in serving the ends of the military campaign against the Muslim armed struggle. And like the rest of the projects and programs on making up for neglect of the Muslim communities, the idea just died out to insignificance.
Perhaps, what had been initiated by Marcos propagandists on Islam and the Muslims may be reconsidered under the present situation. To a large extent, the idea succeeded in becalming the storms of war and appealed to most of the educated, leaders, and professionals among the Muslims who were convinced of the kind of justice that has finally come around. Though there may have been some lessons learned from the “tricks” of the Martial Law period, the idea itself holds a great amount of truth in rendering a finer perspective on the status of the Muslims in the country.

As the military options, going hand in hand with impact development projects, have not resolved entirely the Muslim problem, it becomes a challenge to take on “the road less travelled”. And since approaches and methods are consequent of perceptions and attitudes, it is thus quite an exercise of objectivity to take into account rethinking or re-feeling of the matter at hand as the first of the imperatives in the efforts to find a lasting and comprehensive resolution to the Mindanao conflict.

In consideration of the foregoing proposition, what is necessary is to take a bold step in challenging the traditional view that Islam is a mere punctuation in the pages of Philippine history. Despite the earlier contacts of the natives with Islam of more than two hundred years prior to the coming of the Europeans, there is little said and the least of appreciation on its contribution to the making of a civilization in this part of the world. Indeed, it is sad to note that even the most respected Filipino scholars and historians have one page to tell of Islam that is often dismissed as an accident of the historical forces, bestowing as it were greater importance to more ancient religious experiences in the Indo-Malaysian world.

The conflict situation in Muslim Mindanao is proof of how Islam has come to seal the social transformation of the people who have accepted it as a reference point in their lives. To view Islam as a mere event in the unfolding of human history through time is to take on a perspective that it could be relegated to the past and may only be considered in as far as it serves the interests of the present disposition.

It is often said that Islam is “a way of life”. It is a popularly accepted description but hardly understood. “A way of life” is taken to mean as valid and as applicable to other modes of living and understanding life. It is suggestive of the possibility that Islam could somehow be altered in time. This is not hypothetical nor a presumption. Efforts have been undertaken to introduce such change in Islam. But recent events in the Muslim world have proved that Islam possesses a quality of permanence and by this token it directs or determines the dynamics of history, rather than be swept away and buried in the layers of human existence.

By “way of life” carries with it the notion of Islam as a “civilizing force” that is universal in time and place. The restlessness of Muslim communities throughout the world particularly in the Southern Philippines is borne by the immutable Islamic principles on the kind of civilization that needs to be created in the contemporary context.

The tensions, violent and destructive as they have been, underlie the basic failure in appreciating Islam as the normative element of culture and civilization. This may also be the situation in which non-Muslim societies find themselves in, as they inter-relate with other communities, especially with the Muslims. In this manner, the common ground of the encounter is forced upon religion wherein even the commonalities are in themselves a cause for the differences. This is not to say, however, that such efforts at inter-faith dialogue is short of the measure in forging better understanding and goodwill among the religious communities. On the contrary, this is a major factor in considering a more constructive encounter, that is, on the level of culture or civilization. On this level, the experience could dwell on a synthesis of new ideas, of alternatives in technologies that secure the development of mankind in an atmosphere of peaceful co-existence and cooperation. The Golden Age of Islam in the Middle Ages has attained this level. There is optimism on a similar level of encounter as the quest for world peace and security continues.

In the Philippines, the challenge lies not in integration of a minority into the mainstream life of the majority. It is to effect a synthesis, of acknowledging the element of Islam in the evolution of the Filipino identity and a national spirit and the crucial role of the Muslims in the struggle to keep the freedom of every Filipino.

This may be an idea that may take a long way to realize, but as civilization is a manifestation of the peak of human perfection, all roads will lead ultimately towards this destiny.
(http://www.philsol.nl/A01a/Jumaani-redefining-oct00.htm)