The Peace and Reconciliation Program of the Catholic Relief Services (CRS) celebrated its ten years of peacebuilding work in Mindanao on December 12-13, 2006 at the Rend Convention Center, Vales Beach Resort, Toril, Davao City.
Recognizing that the efforts to promote and build the culture of peace in Mindanao is a journey made with a number of enriching collaborations with various non-government organizations (NGOs), the CRS invited the Consortium of Bangsamoro Civil Society (CBCS) and other partner NGOs to the celebration dubbed as “Partners’ Encounter.”
The celebration adopted as theme, “Ten Years of Peacebuilding Work in Mindanao: Appreciating the Past and Envisioning the Future.”
The Partners’ Encounter focused on the consolidation of the collective peacebuilding work in Mindanao for the past ten years; generating lessons learned in the work; identifying current challenges in peacebuilding vis-à-vis the current context in Mindanao and in the country; articulating the collective direction for the next decade of peacebuilding work and strengthening relationships between the CRS and partner organizations.
Mike Kulat, CBCS program officer for peace and development, and Taher Solaiman, staff, attended the celebration. (TGS)
Tuesday, December 19, 2006
MSU officials, Marines connive to cover-up rape case
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Wednesday, December 6, 2006
MILF sees hard bargaining ahead in talks
After the one-day “question-and-answer session” in Kuala Lumpur last December 1, the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) peace panel predicted a hard bargaining ahead for both Parties, as they are still glued to the four strands of ancestral domain especially territory. Aside from territory, the other strands are concept, resources, and governance, which the government and MILF peace negotiators have succeeded to sign at least 29 pertinent consensus points.
Mohagher Iqbal, chief MILF peace negotiator, after returning from the talks in Malaysia Tuesday, told Luwaran that the prospect for the Parties to forge an agreement is still possible, but the road to that is full of twists and turns.
“Negotiation is not an easy undertaking that only few people have the perseverance and right attitude to withstand the challenges, pressures, and uncertainty surrounding the whole process,” he clarified, adding that to know what you want even if you are rebuffed many times and how to get it is very important.
He described the latest meeting in Kuala Lumpur as very important for the peace process, which enabled the two Parties to have full grasp of the other party’s position, framework, and thinking.
He said the two Parties have not agreed on anything formally in the recent meeting, but mere understanding. Nevertheless, it was recorded officially in the minutes by the Malaysian Secretariat.
Both the MILF and GRP refused to call this meeting as exploratory talks or back-channeling talks.
Asked what the main sticky point is in the present impasse, he said it is still territory, saying the government has not yet presented a proposal good enough to interest or accepted by the MILF.
The MILF wants “more or less contiguous, viable, and wide enough territory” to sustain the proposed Bangsamoro Juridical Entity (BJE) or State. The recent meeting is described by one member of the MILF negotiating team, who requested anonymity, as very cordial, friendly, and issue focused. (www.luwaran.com)
Mohagher Iqbal, chief MILF peace negotiator, after returning from the talks in Malaysia Tuesday, told Luwaran that the prospect for the Parties to forge an agreement is still possible, but the road to that is full of twists and turns.
“Negotiation is not an easy undertaking that only few people have the perseverance and right attitude to withstand the challenges, pressures, and uncertainty surrounding the whole process,” he clarified, adding that to know what you want even if you are rebuffed many times and how to get it is very important.
He described the latest meeting in Kuala Lumpur as very important for the peace process, which enabled the two Parties to have full grasp of the other party’s position, framework, and thinking.
He said the two Parties have not agreed on anything formally in the recent meeting, but mere understanding. Nevertheless, it was recorded officially in the minutes by the Malaysian Secretariat.
Both the MILF and GRP refused to call this meeting as exploratory talks or back-channeling talks.
Asked what the main sticky point is in the present impasse, he said it is still territory, saying the government has not yet presented a proposal good enough to interest or accepted by the MILF.
The MILF wants “more or less contiguous, viable, and wide enough territory” to sustain the proposed Bangsamoro Juridical Entity (BJE) or State. The recent meeting is described by one member of the MILF negotiating team, who requested anonymity, as very cordial, friendly, and issue focused. (www.luwaran.com)
Wednesday, November 22, 2006
THE TACUB MASSACRE REVISITED
Written by TAHER G. SOLAIMAN
Thirty-five years have passed since the infamous Tacub Massacre on November 22, 1971. Yet, the memory of the barbarous killing of sixty Moro Maranaos that day still remain fresh in the minds of the Bangsamoro people.
Why and how did it happen?
The national election was held on November 8, 1971. But due to the harassments of the dreaded ILAGA (see box), many Moro voters in Mindanao were not able to cast their votes. Many of them were in the evacuation centers then. A special election had to be set on November 22.
The ILAGA Terror Gang
The ILAGA was a terror gang backed by Philippine government officials, both civilian and military. Its members, composed mainly of Ilongos, a tribe in the Visayas Island, were notorious in sowing terror among the Moro populace in Mindanao particularly in the early 70’s. They massacred innocent Moro civilians and looted their properties. Their signature was the severing of the ears of their victims.
Ilaga is a Visayan vernacular that means rat. Some documents would reveal later, however, that ILAGA was actually an acronym for Ilongo Land Grabbers’ Association.
In his Revolt in Mindanao: The Rise of Islam in Philippine Politics, T. J. S. George quoted a confidential 1973 study by a Muslim activist on behalf of a government department, saying that the Ilaga was founded in Cotabato City in September 1970 by Wenceslao de la Serna of Alamada; Esteban Doruelo of Pigkawayan, who was then running for Governor in Cotabato Province; Pacifico de la Serna of Libungan; Nicholas Dequiňa, a former officer of the Philippine Constabulary (PC); Bonifacio Tejada of Mlang; Conrado Lemana of Tulunan and Mayor Jose Escribano of Tacurong.
Some members of the Teduray ethnic group also joined the ILAGA terror gang. Their leader was Feliciano Luces (a. k. a. Kumander Toothpick), an Ilongo protégé of Philippine Constabulary (PC) Captain Tronco who was then a mayoralty candidate in Upi running against Michael “Datu Puti” Sinsuat.
Both in Cotabato and Lanao Provinces, the terror sowed by the ILAGA was at its peak in 1971. In June 19 that year, in what came to have been known later as the Manili Massacre, some seventy Moro – men, women and children – were mercilessly killed by the notorious gangsters, with the backing of the PC, inside a mosque in Manili village in Carmen, Cotabato.
Aboard five trucks, a group of Maranaos went to Magsaysay town in Lanao del Norte to cast their votes.
When they reached Tacub village in Kauswagan town on their way back to the evacuation centers where they were staying, they came upon a checkpoint of the Philippine Army.
On the pretext of searching concealed weapons, the military men manning the checkpoint ordered those aboard the trucks to alight and lie flat on the road, face down. As soon as they were able to comply with the military men’s order, the deadly command, “Fire!” was heard.
When the gun smoke cleared, at least 60 bodies, bathed in their own blood, lay sprawled on the ground. While some sources placed the number of those killed as thirty-nine or forty, most Muslim sources claim sixty persons were killed.
After an hour, a group of reporters, who covered the special election, arrived at the site of the tragic incident.
The reporters found a small group of soldiers in the checkpoint. Aside from the soldiers, they saw some civilians, apparently members of the much dreaded ILAGA gang, with white headbands checking the trucks.
T. J. S. George described what the reporters found, thus:
“They saw the small bands of soldiers lounging lazily about their checkpost. But a number of civilians with white headbands were rummaging about, inspecting the trucks – and markedly uninterested in the victims of the shooting who were lying in their own blood, a few of them still alive. An elderly man, badly wounded, prayed as his body twitched in spasms. One of the ‘inspectors’ asked him to shut up. As the old man went on praying, the man with the headband kicked him -- and there was silence. A bleeding man tried to stand up, uttered an unusual scream, then slumped, head first to the road.”
The next morning, the story about the carnage spread throughout the country.
“It became painfully clear that there had been some collusion between the soldiers and the gangsters,” as George would put it.
George further explained that “officials searched in vain for a convincing explanation. They faced the unsettling fact that, unlike the Magsaysay tragedy a month earlier, the troops in Tacub had neither the excuse of a siege emergency nor an arguable motive of vengeance. One explanation subsequently offered was that the ambush-killing of troops in Magsaysay in October had generally made soldiers so tense that at the merest suggestion of an attack they pulled the trigger in a reflexive act of self-preservation. But panic hardly justified the lack of attention shown the victims and the accommodation apparently extended to the mysterious civilians in white headbands.”
Much as they wanted to, the government officials did not find any excuse for the barbarous act. No amount of explanations could exonerate them from culpability for that heinous crime.
“The fact that a local patrol could make common cause with underworld and mow down a group of unarmed people confirmed the feeling among Muslims that their persecutors enjoyed the support of the establishment,” George claimed.
Till this day, the hapless victims of the massacre are still crying for justice.
Thirty-five years have passed since the infamous Tacub Massacre on November 22, 1971. Yet, the memory of the barbarous killing of sixty Moro Maranaos that day still remain fresh in the minds of the Bangsamoro people.
Why and how did it happen?
The national election was held on November 8, 1971. But due to the harassments of the dreaded ILAGA (see box), many Moro voters in Mindanao were not able to cast their votes. Many of them were in the evacuation centers then. A special election had to be set on November 22.
The ILAGA Terror Gang
The ILAGA was a terror gang backed by Philippine government officials, both civilian and military. Its members, composed mainly of Ilongos, a tribe in the Visayas Island, were notorious in sowing terror among the Moro populace in Mindanao particularly in the early 70’s. They massacred innocent Moro civilians and looted their properties. Their signature was the severing of the ears of their victims.
Ilaga is a Visayan vernacular that means rat. Some documents would reveal later, however, that ILAGA was actually an acronym for Ilongo Land Grabbers’ Association.
In his Revolt in Mindanao: The Rise of Islam in Philippine Politics, T. J. S. George quoted a confidential 1973 study by a Muslim activist on behalf of a government department, saying that the Ilaga was founded in Cotabato City in September 1970 by Wenceslao de la Serna of Alamada; Esteban Doruelo of Pigkawayan, who was then running for Governor in Cotabato Province; Pacifico de la Serna of Libungan; Nicholas Dequiňa, a former officer of the Philippine Constabulary (PC); Bonifacio Tejada of Mlang; Conrado Lemana of Tulunan and Mayor Jose Escribano of Tacurong.
Some members of the Teduray ethnic group also joined the ILAGA terror gang. Their leader was Feliciano Luces (a. k. a. Kumander Toothpick), an Ilongo protégé of Philippine Constabulary (PC) Captain Tronco who was then a mayoralty candidate in Upi running against Michael “Datu Puti” Sinsuat.
Both in Cotabato and Lanao Provinces, the terror sowed by the ILAGA was at its peak in 1971. In June 19 that year, in what came to have been known later as the Manili Massacre, some seventy Moro – men, women and children – were mercilessly killed by the notorious gangsters, with the backing of the PC, inside a mosque in Manili village in Carmen, Cotabato.
Aboard five trucks, a group of Maranaos went to Magsaysay town in Lanao del Norte to cast their votes.
When they reached Tacub village in Kauswagan town on their way back to the evacuation centers where they were staying, they came upon a checkpoint of the Philippine Army.
On the pretext of searching concealed weapons, the military men manning the checkpoint ordered those aboard the trucks to alight and lie flat on the road, face down. As soon as they were able to comply with the military men’s order, the deadly command, “Fire!” was heard.
When the gun smoke cleared, at least 60 bodies, bathed in their own blood, lay sprawled on the ground. While some sources placed the number of those killed as thirty-nine or forty, most Muslim sources claim sixty persons were killed.
After an hour, a group of reporters, who covered the special election, arrived at the site of the tragic incident.
The reporters found a small group of soldiers in the checkpoint. Aside from the soldiers, they saw some civilians, apparently members of the much dreaded ILAGA gang, with white headbands checking the trucks.
T. J. S. George described what the reporters found, thus:
“They saw the small bands of soldiers lounging lazily about their checkpost. But a number of civilians with white headbands were rummaging about, inspecting the trucks – and markedly uninterested in the victims of the shooting who were lying in their own blood, a few of them still alive. An elderly man, badly wounded, prayed as his body twitched in spasms. One of the ‘inspectors’ asked him to shut up. As the old man went on praying, the man with the headband kicked him -- and there was silence. A bleeding man tried to stand up, uttered an unusual scream, then slumped, head first to the road.”
The next morning, the story about the carnage spread throughout the country.
“It became painfully clear that there had been some collusion between the soldiers and the gangsters,” as George would put it.
George further explained that “officials searched in vain for a convincing explanation. They faced the unsettling fact that, unlike the Magsaysay tragedy a month earlier, the troops in Tacub had neither the excuse of a siege emergency nor an arguable motive of vengeance. One explanation subsequently offered was that the ambush-killing of troops in Magsaysay in October had generally made soldiers so tense that at the merest suggestion of an attack they pulled the trigger in a reflexive act of self-preservation. But panic hardly justified the lack of attention shown the victims and the accommodation apparently extended to the mysterious civilians in white headbands.”
Much as they wanted to, the government officials did not find any excuse for the barbarous act. No amount of explanations could exonerate them from culpability for that heinous crime.
“The fact that a local patrol could make common cause with underworld and mow down a group of unarmed people confirmed the feeling among Muslims that their persecutors enjoyed the support of the establishment,” George claimed.
Till this day, the hapless victims of the massacre are still crying for justice.
Thursday, November 16, 2006
The Bangsamoro Struggle for Self-Determination
(Delivered by Guiamel M. Alim, Executive Director, Kadtuntaya Foundation, Inc., a non-government organization based in Cotabato City, Mindanao Island, Southern Philippines, at the European Solidarity Conference on the Philippines, Philippine Solidarity 2000: In Search of New Perspectives, held on 23-25 June 1995 at Hoisdorf, Germany)
The Bangsa Moro struggle for self-determination is already a struggle of generations. The longest in Asia and maybe the whole world, it started in the 16th century and up to now there is no clear indiator yet as to when it will end. Other peoples' struggle in the world have either succeeded or been totally crushed. The Moro struggle is still going on. It is an ongoing struggle for survival, cultural identity and for the right to self-determination.
The Bangsa Moro: Who are they?
Bangsa Moro ("the Moro People") is the generic name for the 13 ethnolinguistic Muslim tribes in the Philippines which constitute a quarter of the population in Mindanao in the Southern Philippines. They number from 5-6 million and are found in every major island of the country. They share a distinct culture, speak different dialects, are varied in their social formation but share a common belief in Islam. This is a uniting factor among the different groups.
Of the 13 groups, there are three major groups on the bases of population and their leadership. These are the Maguindanaons (the people of the flooded plains), the Maranaos (people living around the lake) and the Tausogs (people of the current). These major groups have rallied the support of the Bangsa Moro in their struggle for self-determination.
The history of the struggle
The Bangsa Moro struggle for self-determination cannot be placed in proper perspective without a brief account of the Islamic era which began in the year 1310 A.D. through the efforts of Arab traders, travellers, sufis (saintly Muslims) and Muslim missionaries. Islam as a way of life (politics, governance, economic systems, justice systems, etc.) spread and soon Islamic principalities in Sulu and Maguindanao were established. In the 15th century and early 16th century, the Sultanate of Sulu and Maguindanao came into being. Each sultanate was independent, had sovereign power and had diplomatic and trade relations with other countries in the region.
Other Muslim principalities known as emirates, like those of Rajah Solaiman in Manila and the emirates of Panay and Mindoro, were also born. This goes to show that Islam stands on record as the first political institution, the first institutional religion, the first educational system and the first civilization in the Philippines, and that its economy was far advanced than those of the other indigenous communities. But before the Bangsa Moro could fully grow into full nationstatehood, a series of foreign colonial interventions came their way.
Colonial Aggression against the Bangsa Moro
The Spanish invasion and colonial aggression about 160 years after the existence of the Islamic Sultanates and principalities marked the beginning of Spanish tutelage and the halt of Islamic advancement in the northern islands of Luzon and Visayas. In Mindanao, the Moro relentlessly fought against Western colonialism for a span of more than 300 years.
The Spanish expedition in Mindanao in the second half of the 16th century with 1,500 Christianized indios also signaled the beginning of centuries of wars and bitter relations between the Christians and the Muslims in the Philippines. The Spanish colonizers succeeded in imparting to the Christianized majority their chauvinist outlook of the Moro people and the other indigenous people. The moro-moro play, for example, which became an integral part of many a folk and religious festival, instilled in the conquered peoples the belief that everything wicked and treacherous is synonymous with the Muslims and that everything noble and good was done by Christians. The Moros were vilified as juramentados, herejes, feroces, etc. who will burn in hell.
Today, this relationship, characterized by mutual prejudices between the Muslims and the Christians, have become a blocking factor in their cooperation and harmonious co-existence. The Hispanization and Christianization of early Filipinos provided a strong base for the Spanish anti-Muslim campaign, militarily and otherwise, even after the Treaty of Paris on December 19, 1898 which ceded the Philippines to America for $20 million. Spanish aggression did not subjugate the Moro people who remained determined to resist any colonial rule in their homeland.
America delivered the death blow to their right to self-determination
The Moro people fiercely fought against American imperialism. However, unlike her predecessor, the Americans did not solely depend on the use of military force and divide-and-rule tactics to quell the Moro resistance. They employed several policies of attraction, namely: establishing the so-called Moro province which will look after the welfare of the Moro prople. However, the same Moro province was meant to administratively facilitate colonization of the Moro people.
An amnesty program allowed Moro rebels to surrender to American authorities. An education program which granted free higher education to sons and daughters of Moro leaders and the forging of agreements like that of the Bates Treaty with the Moro leaders were all part of the convenient colonization process. As effective conquest tools, the Americans had been able to neutralize Moro resistance and delivered the death blow to the Bangsa Moro struggle for self-determination.
After gaining political control, the American colonial government declared the entire archipelago as public land, including those considered by the Bangsa Moro as their ancestral homeland. They established foreign education, put up foreign government, brought in settlers from the North and started the exploitation of Mindanao's rich resources. Thus the beginning of the minoritization and marginalization of the Bangsa Moro. The impact of such colonial machination is still very much felt today.
Legally, the Bangsa Moro lost their lands because of the Torrens land titling system. They became acculturated due to the public school system which is foreign to their culture. The indigenous political system was replaced with a new system. Today, many of their territories are either controlled by elite settlers or by foreign multinational corporations.
After ensuring its continuous political control and economic interest in the Philippines, the Americans granted independence to the Philippines. Despite protest from the Moro leaders, Mindanao was annexed to the soon-to-be-independent Philippines. Thus, the most awaited transfer of power and reins of government to the Filipino elite.
The post-colonial annexation of the Bangsa Moro homeland to the Philippines
While the Filipino elites of Luzon and Visayas joyfully celebrated what they considered to be the beginning of their freedom and independence and the birth of a new nation, the Bangsa Moro considered the event as the death of their own freedom, independence and long-held sovereignty.
The succeeding presidents of the Republic pursued the task of nation-building that integrated the non-Christians to the mainstream of Filipino culture. In so doing, they used the carrot-and-stick approach against the resisting indigenous people. They continued the scholarship program, the Torrens system, co-opted traditional leaders and brought in more settlers.
Land-grabbing, legal and otherwise, became rampant. The settlers became conscious to grab political power. They organized and armed a Christian extremist group, the Ilaga, to protect their interests, namely, to acquire more land and grab power. On the other hand, the Moro people organized their own defense force and resisted the encroachment of settlers into their territories. The short-lived and traditional-leaders-led Mindanao Independence Movement (MIM) was organized.
Soon the situation turned out of control. Civil war broke out. The succeeding events saw Christian settlers fighting against the Moro people in a war where both protagonists turned out to be the losers in the end.
Despite the neutralization of the MIM, there were no signs of the turmoil in Mindanao abating, until the worst episode of Muslim-Christian conflict in the early '70s, when a series of massacres against the Moro people was committed. This also partly justified the declaration of martial law or the continuance of Marcos rule.
Martial Law and the Birth of new resistance
At the height of the much-talked-about Martial Law and responding to the imminent danger of ethnocide, a new revolutionary movement, more aggressive and youth-led, came into being. The Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) pursued the struggle for Muslim independence. Moro society rallied behind the move to create an independent state. A destructive war ensued between the MNLF and the AFP that would reach its peak from 1972 - 1975. Christian settlers were allowed to arm themselves to join the war. Seventy percent of the total AFP strength, with all the available war materiel, was used in Mindanao to neutralize the Moro resistance.
All told, the war was disastrous, on the one hand. So many lives were lost--150,000-200,000. The value of properties destroyed was put in billions, including government infrastructure. Some 200,000 refugees fled to Sabah, Malaysia and hundreds of thousands of local refugees wandered around for safety. Many have become permanent refugees in many urban centers in Mindanao.
In urban areas, the refugees feel safe but their lives are miserable. They have no permanent jobs. They stay in congested areas. They become manual laborers, pedicab drivers, domestic helpers and sidewalk vendors tending ambulant stalls along roadways. Many Moro women become prostitutes; others married Christian men. The impact of war is also disastrous to children. Moro children are prone to violence. Poverty forced many school-age children to join parents to eke out a living or stay home to take care of small kids.
On the other hand, the MNLF in particular and the Bangsa Moro in general, consider the war, inspite its disastrous impact, both in terms of lives and properties lost, as an initial victory of the struggle. This is so, because the soon-to-be-signed Tripoli Agreement was a formal written document which made the Philippine government recognize the Moro people's right to self-determination.
The Marcos government and the infamous Tripoli Agreement
The Marcos government was pressured from both within the country and outside to stop the costly war. The war has become known in Muslim countries especially the OIC (Organization of Islamic Conference). The government was spending big amounts of money to sustain the war. Investors were shying away and parents of soldiers who died in the war were showing concern over the death of their sons in a war where there is no winner but only losers.
All these pressures made the Marcos government sign an agreement with the MNLF known as the Tripoli Agreement of 1976. The agreement was aimed at providing a political negotiated settlement to the Moro problem through the grant of autonomy to the Muslims in the Southern Philippines. The government insisted on a plebiscite to settle the territories of the autonomous government as allegedly provided for in the agreement.
The MNLF did not recognize the result of the plebiscite, thus the negotiations bogged down. In the meantime, Marcos won over many of the MNLF ranks through various forms of attraction, ranging from amnesty to luxurious government posts. He pursued the creation of two administrative autonomous regions. This was reminiscent of the province set up under the colonial American regime. Another legacy was the creation of the Muslim Affairs Office directly under the Office of the President. All these were meant to appease the Moro people. Amid all these government programs, the armed struggle continued, though quietly.
A splittist group within the ranks of the MNLF broke away and formed what later would be known as the MILF (Moro Islamic Liberation Front). The MILF, which is dominated by the Maguindaons, is asserting Islamic ideology as distint from the nationalist tendency of the MNLF, although both are for the implementation of the Tripoli Agreement. The MILF is continuously building up its organized and armed strength.
The Cory Aquino policies to the Moro problem
Under the Aquino government, another attempt at negotiated settlement was made with the MNLF. The focus of the negotiation was also the Tripoli Agreement. But before anything could be agreed upon, the new Philippine Constitution was ratified. The talks bogged down.
The Constitution provides for a commission to draft an Organic Act that would shape the autonomous government in the region. This has become the legal basis for the creation of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindaqnao (ARMM). Four provinces out of 13 provinces voted to join. This is far from what the Tripoli Agreement provides.
The ARMM is essentially an extension of the elite-dominated Congress. It has not lived up to the expectations of its constituents. It has not made any significant improvement both in the economic life of the people and their security. In fact, it has become a congregation of the Moro elite as an extension arm of the President. Worse, it has become a source of corruption and polarization of the Bangsa Moro.
The prospects of the ongoing peace talks with the Ramos government
The Ramos government also entered into peace negotiations with the MNLF. The agreement is to discuss the modalities of implementing the Tripoli Agreement. The MILF has declared a supportive stance and a wait-and-see posture to avoid any excuse form the government to derail the talks. The peace negotiation has been dragging on for two years. According to a government panel member, nothing substantial has been achieved except the exchange of proposals. Legally speaking, the Tripoli Agreement could not be implemented through an Executive Order. The Congress must amend or change the Organic Act and come up with a new law to implement the creation of an autonomous government. This pushes the Tripoli Agreement to the sideline.
As in the past two governments, the present government of Ramos is tied with the Constitution. In the meantime, some sectors of the population demand participation in the ongoing peace talks. Amidst optimism by both camps, many observers feel that the ongoing peace negotiations is a case of history repeating itself.
Emergence of new forces
In the meantime, while the MNLF and the government are talking peace, other armed groups are coming out. The MILF, with its growing strength, warns that "in the event the talks will collapse, it will pursue the struggle at all costs, as it will feel there is no more point of talking, saying they have no more choice except to return to the barrel of the gun."
Another group bannering the right to self-determination of the Bangsa Moro is the national democratic-inspired Moro Revolutionary Organization (MRO). The MRO, with undetermined strength, is demanding for equal participation in the ongoing peace talks with the government saying peace is the project of all.
The birth of Fundamentalism/Extremism?
Lately, another armed group espousing an Islamic state for the Muslims in the Philippines came to the picture. This is the Abu Sayyaf, which the government has accused of terrorism in Mindanao. The Abu Sayyaf, working for an Islamic state, is opposed to the ongoing peace talks between the MNLF and the government. The Abu Sayyaf is linked to international terrorism by the government. Since the emergence of the Abu Sayyaf (father of the sword/children of the sword) in southern Philippines in 1992, particularly in Basilan, Zamboanga, Sulu and Tawi-Tawi, the government authorities, in their desperate effort to stop the growth of this group, has raised the issue of Islamic fundamentalism, extremism or terrorism--a legacy of Western bigotry against Islam.
The government, responding to the atrocities of the Abu Sayyaf, has launched an all-out sawyer (war?) and repressive measures against Muslim religious groups in the country, including Pakistanis, Iranian and Arab nationals, on suspicion of supporting and sympathizing with the Abu Sayyaf.
Even Bangsa Moro Muslim missionaries engaged in active religious work are being surveilled and some have been arrested on suspicion of being Abu Sayyaf members.
Observers say that government authorities, in their efforts to dismantle the Abu Sayyaf, have linked Islamic fundamentalism or extremism in the Philippines to international terrorism in order to please the enemies of Islam and to demonize Islam through black propaganda.
However, some evidence would show that the carnage in Basilan and Zamboanga were purely the handiwork of criminal elements manipulated by the government. And also on the Ipil carnage, the Islamic Command Council, a breakaway faction of the MNLF, and the military were allegedly responsible.
The MNLF, MILF and other Moro organizations are one in denouncing the kidnappings, bombings and other forms of criminal acts. However, they also believe that such extremist option will continue to plague the Philippines for as long as the problems of the Moro people are ignored by the authorities.
Philippines 2000: Another threat to the Bangsa Moro struggle for self-determination
Like in the colonial periods, programs like agricultural colonies and settlement projects were established in Moroland in the guise of development. But all these were found to have worked against the interest and rights of the indigenous people.
The Philippines 2000 project of the Ramos government, which aims at industrializing the country to be at par with the other economic "tigers" of Asia, is viewed with antagonism by the Moro people. Like in the past, this can be another ploy, in the guise of development, to grab the ancestral lands of the Moro people to give way to infrastructure, road expansion, big industries and agricultural plantations, which will drive away the Bangsa Moro and the other indigenous communities. Despite opposition, ongoing construction of industrial sites are paving the way for the dislocation of Moro families in the South.
The Moro people are already starting to pay the costly price of industrialization. For example:
Some 22 poor families will be ejected in General Santos City to pave the way for the construction of a government Philippine Fisher ies Development Authority International Fishport;
Moro communities were demolished to con struct a park and a hotel for tourists;
Badjaos' homes were demolished to make way for the expansion of a wharf;
To construct an international fishport, homes of fisherfolk have to be demolished. Another community is to be demolished for the expan sion of international airport;
Even a cemetery was not spared, to give way for the construction of a shuttle bus terminal;
Staple crops have to give way to exportable crops at the expense of the poor people.
The Bangsamoro, not having enough capital, could not invest in big industries but merely provide a source of cheap labor.
Industrialization would pave the way for development aggression and would sidetrack the real roots of the Moro people's quest for self-determination. Philippines 2000 certainly is a grand design for a continuing effort to eliminate the basic rights and prerogatives of the Moro people from their ancestral land.
This would only facilitate the intrusion of foreign and local agricultural plantation, heavy industries and the like that would only drain the natural resources within the ancestral domain of the indigenous people.
Already, some countries from the Middle East are scouting around for land in the ARMM, particularly those within the site of Regional Industrial Centers, for agro-industrial plantation sites. Eventually, due to the high cost of farming and the lack of support from the government, the farmers will be enticed to sell their lands to foreign investors.
Tourism, which is an important package of industrialization, would be disastrous to the cultural life of the indigenous people. As foreign culture proliferates, acculturation among the local people would become easier.
Where and How are the Bangsa Moro: Their socio-economic situation
As the Bangsa Moro are pre-occupied in their war for survival, identity and nation-in-making, their economic life is becoming more difficult. In the hierarchy of poverty, the Bangsamoro belongs to the poorest of the poor with majority of them earning a living as peasant farmers and fisherfolk. Moro farmers generally suffer from low productivity due to lack of access to technology aside from lack of capitalization for farm inputs. This is not to mention pest-infestation, soil erosion and the increasingly longer dry spell due to the continuous denudation of the surrounding forests. The drying up and pollution of the rivers have likewise deprived Moro farmers with reliable irrigation systems and safe water.
The lack of support from government in the form of subsidies and credit facilities has forced them to turn to local traders who subject them to usurious practices. In remote barangays, where there are no farm-to-market roads and where there is no immediate buyer nor storage facilities, crops are sometimes left to rot. Those who manage to transport their crops to the market are likewise at the mercy of traders who often underprice their products.
Among the Moro fisherfolk, the incursion of foreign trawlers, mainly Japanese and Taiwanese, results in a poor yield because of the depletion of marine resources in the region. To compete with the giant vessels, small fisherfolk often resort to cyanide fishing and other disastrous means of catching fish.
To add insult to injury, many Moros are hired as rice planters by Christian families. During harvest, they go back to gather the palay hulls and sort out the grain from the straw. In congested areas in urban areas, they are sidewalk vendors, manual laborers, pedicab drivers and vegetable vendors. Prostitution has become a source of employment despite its being prohibited by Islam.
Moro women have to join their spouses in the farm or in fishing. Hundreds of thousands of them are domestic helpers in the Middle East. Many come home with horrifying stories. School-age children have to take care of the small kids. Malnourishment and high mortality rate are found in dominantly Muslim communities, especially in the rural areas.
Five of the thirteen poorest provinces in the Philippines are populated mainly by the Moros. And yet, the same provinces are vulnerable to unstable peace and order conditions caused by sporadic armed clashes between Moro armed groups and the revolutionary forces on the one hand, and the AFP, on the other hand. Thousands of Moro evacuees are still languishing in refugee centers.
The perennial problems of dislocation
The Moro people started to experience evacuation since the latter part of the '60s. This has culminated in the '70s during the height of the war against the Marcos regime. A lull was created after the signing of the Tripoli Agreement in December 23, 1976. During these periods, a ceasefire agreement was signed between the MNLF and the government. It was indeed a breathing space for the Bangsa Moro who had been economically and politically displaced by the war.
When the peace talks bogged down, the tension started again, though evacuation was not as frequent as before. This situation prevailed all throughout the Aquino government until 3 years ago when a renewed militarization took place against kidnapping syndicates and against the MILF in Maguindanao who opposed the construction of a dam that would deprive the local inhabitants of their rightful claims over their ancestral lands, and the Abu Sayyaf in the Zamboanga, Basilan and Sulu areas of Western Mindanao.
In all of these military operations, thousands of Moro civilians had to flee to safer places. Hundreds of thousands worth of properties were lost. There were many casualties on both sides and there were also many civilians who became casualties of crossfire between the Moro armed groups and the military. The situation became another burdern to the already miserable life of many Bangsa Moro.
The Moro people's response
The Bangsa Moro people's reactions vary. The traditional political leaders emphasize maintaining loyalty with the Philippine constitution and cooperating with the government. Those in government positions are either silent or are for the status quo.
The religious leaders give emphasis to spiritual enrichment to overcome human problems in the homeland. To be obedient to God is their battlecry.
The MNLF is engaged in peace talks with the government. The MILF is in a wait-and-see stance while doing heavy indoctrination and spreading the concept of Islamic government. Another Moro armed group is the MRO, whose activities combine education and guerrilla formation. The Abu Sayyaf is also building up its forces and strength.
Amid all these responses by the armed Moro groups, the traditional leaders and those in the government, are the NGOs which combine education work with direct services and advocacy. In a span of a decade, more NGOs have been organized in Moro areas doing literacy work, socio-economic activities, community-organizing and capability-building among organized communities. The challenge is great considering various threats, including that of being labeled as rebels or their supporters.
The need for collective action: The task of solidarity
The peoples in the Philippines have shared a common history of struggle against colonial aggression and national oppression.
The problem of poverty, illiteracy and oppression and exploitation, while being heavily felt by the indigenous people, are also common to majority Filipinos. We also have a common desire to be free from the pangs of poverty, ill-health and oppression. We have the same dream of a better life. All these are binding factors that calls for eightened solidarity among the oppressed people, on one hand, and between the oppressed people and concerned people of the First World countries, as is the case in Europe. Along this line, the Moro people view the present solidarity between the Filipinos and the people in Europe with great appreciation.
It suggests, however, that such solidarity be extended too to struggling indigenous peoples in the Philippines considering their distinct culture, way of life and perspective of society. This would, therefore, entail a thorough study of the life and history of the Moro people, their culture, and their dreams. Towards achieving a common goal, the success of the Moro struggle will be the success of the Filipino struggle. The success of the struggle of the oppressed nations will be the success of solidarity.
Areas of Concerns
Solidarity work can consider the following as its areas of concern in dealing with the issue of the Moro people and other indigenous people of the Philippines:
The broad issue of the right to self-determination which ranges from ancestral claims to demands for a meaningful autonomous set-up;
Programs of Moro NGOs and other indigenous peoples related to the protection
Programs related to the welfare of women and children, especially those in the Moro areas and other indigenous peoples' communities;
Programs for exchange of information and for exposures;
Programs that can respond to here-and-now needs of the indigenous people in the Philippines.
Thank you and more power to solidarity. May your tribe increase.
(http://www.philsol.nl/solcon/Guiamel-95.htm)
The Bangsa Moro struggle for self-determination is already a struggle of generations. The longest in Asia and maybe the whole world, it started in the 16th century and up to now there is no clear indiator yet as to when it will end. Other peoples' struggle in the world have either succeeded or been totally crushed. The Moro struggle is still going on. It is an ongoing struggle for survival, cultural identity and for the right to self-determination.
The Bangsa Moro: Who are they?
Bangsa Moro ("the Moro People") is the generic name for the 13 ethnolinguistic Muslim tribes in the Philippines which constitute a quarter of the population in Mindanao in the Southern Philippines. They number from 5-6 million and are found in every major island of the country. They share a distinct culture, speak different dialects, are varied in their social formation but share a common belief in Islam. This is a uniting factor among the different groups.
Of the 13 groups, there are three major groups on the bases of population and their leadership. These are the Maguindanaons (the people of the flooded plains), the Maranaos (people living around the lake) and the Tausogs (people of the current). These major groups have rallied the support of the Bangsa Moro in their struggle for self-determination.
The history of the struggle
The Bangsa Moro struggle for self-determination cannot be placed in proper perspective without a brief account of the Islamic era which began in the year 1310 A.D. through the efforts of Arab traders, travellers, sufis (saintly Muslims) and Muslim missionaries. Islam as a way of life (politics, governance, economic systems, justice systems, etc.) spread and soon Islamic principalities in Sulu and Maguindanao were established. In the 15th century and early 16th century, the Sultanate of Sulu and Maguindanao came into being. Each sultanate was independent, had sovereign power and had diplomatic and trade relations with other countries in the region.
Other Muslim principalities known as emirates, like those of Rajah Solaiman in Manila and the emirates of Panay and Mindoro, were also born. This goes to show that Islam stands on record as the first political institution, the first institutional religion, the first educational system and the first civilization in the Philippines, and that its economy was far advanced than those of the other indigenous communities. But before the Bangsa Moro could fully grow into full nationstatehood, a series of foreign colonial interventions came their way.
Colonial Aggression against the Bangsa Moro
The Spanish invasion and colonial aggression about 160 years after the existence of the Islamic Sultanates and principalities marked the beginning of Spanish tutelage and the halt of Islamic advancement in the northern islands of Luzon and Visayas. In Mindanao, the Moro relentlessly fought against Western colonialism for a span of more than 300 years.
The Spanish expedition in Mindanao in the second half of the 16th century with 1,500 Christianized indios also signaled the beginning of centuries of wars and bitter relations between the Christians and the Muslims in the Philippines. The Spanish colonizers succeeded in imparting to the Christianized majority their chauvinist outlook of the Moro people and the other indigenous people. The moro-moro play, for example, which became an integral part of many a folk and religious festival, instilled in the conquered peoples the belief that everything wicked and treacherous is synonymous with the Muslims and that everything noble and good was done by Christians. The Moros were vilified as juramentados, herejes, feroces, etc. who will burn in hell.
Today, this relationship, characterized by mutual prejudices between the Muslims and the Christians, have become a blocking factor in their cooperation and harmonious co-existence. The Hispanization and Christianization of early Filipinos provided a strong base for the Spanish anti-Muslim campaign, militarily and otherwise, even after the Treaty of Paris on December 19, 1898 which ceded the Philippines to America for $20 million. Spanish aggression did not subjugate the Moro people who remained determined to resist any colonial rule in their homeland.
America delivered the death blow to their right to self-determination
The Moro people fiercely fought against American imperialism. However, unlike her predecessor, the Americans did not solely depend on the use of military force and divide-and-rule tactics to quell the Moro resistance. They employed several policies of attraction, namely: establishing the so-called Moro province which will look after the welfare of the Moro prople. However, the same Moro province was meant to administratively facilitate colonization of the Moro people.
An amnesty program allowed Moro rebels to surrender to American authorities. An education program which granted free higher education to sons and daughters of Moro leaders and the forging of agreements like that of the Bates Treaty with the Moro leaders were all part of the convenient colonization process. As effective conquest tools, the Americans had been able to neutralize Moro resistance and delivered the death blow to the Bangsa Moro struggle for self-determination.
After gaining political control, the American colonial government declared the entire archipelago as public land, including those considered by the Bangsa Moro as their ancestral homeland. They established foreign education, put up foreign government, brought in settlers from the North and started the exploitation of Mindanao's rich resources. Thus the beginning of the minoritization and marginalization of the Bangsa Moro. The impact of such colonial machination is still very much felt today.
Legally, the Bangsa Moro lost their lands because of the Torrens land titling system. They became acculturated due to the public school system which is foreign to their culture. The indigenous political system was replaced with a new system. Today, many of their territories are either controlled by elite settlers or by foreign multinational corporations.
After ensuring its continuous political control and economic interest in the Philippines, the Americans granted independence to the Philippines. Despite protest from the Moro leaders, Mindanao was annexed to the soon-to-be-independent Philippines. Thus, the most awaited transfer of power and reins of government to the Filipino elite.
The post-colonial annexation of the Bangsa Moro homeland to the Philippines
While the Filipino elites of Luzon and Visayas joyfully celebrated what they considered to be the beginning of their freedom and independence and the birth of a new nation, the Bangsa Moro considered the event as the death of their own freedom, independence and long-held sovereignty.
The succeeding presidents of the Republic pursued the task of nation-building that integrated the non-Christians to the mainstream of Filipino culture. In so doing, they used the carrot-and-stick approach against the resisting indigenous people. They continued the scholarship program, the Torrens system, co-opted traditional leaders and brought in more settlers.
Land-grabbing, legal and otherwise, became rampant. The settlers became conscious to grab political power. They organized and armed a Christian extremist group, the Ilaga, to protect their interests, namely, to acquire more land and grab power. On the other hand, the Moro people organized their own defense force and resisted the encroachment of settlers into their territories. The short-lived and traditional-leaders-led Mindanao Independence Movement (MIM) was organized.
Soon the situation turned out of control. Civil war broke out. The succeeding events saw Christian settlers fighting against the Moro people in a war where both protagonists turned out to be the losers in the end.
Despite the neutralization of the MIM, there were no signs of the turmoil in Mindanao abating, until the worst episode of Muslim-Christian conflict in the early '70s, when a series of massacres against the Moro people was committed. This also partly justified the declaration of martial law or the continuance of Marcos rule.
Martial Law and the Birth of new resistance
At the height of the much-talked-about Martial Law and responding to the imminent danger of ethnocide, a new revolutionary movement, more aggressive and youth-led, came into being. The Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) pursued the struggle for Muslim independence. Moro society rallied behind the move to create an independent state. A destructive war ensued between the MNLF and the AFP that would reach its peak from 1972 - 1975. Christian settlers were allowed to arm themselves to join the war. Seventy percent of the total AFP strength, with all the available war materiel, was used in Mindanao to neutralize the Moro resistance.
All told, the war was disastrous, on the one hand. So many lives were lost--150,000-200,000. The value of properties destroyed was put in billions, including government infrastructure. Some 200,000 refugees fled to Sabah, Malaysia and hundreds of thousands of local refugees wandered around for safety. Many have become permanent refugees in many urban centers in Mindanao.
In urban areas, the refugees feel safe but their lives are miserable. They have no permanent jobs. They stay in congested areas. They become manual laborers, pedicab drivers, domestic helpers and sidewalk vendors tending ambulant stalls along roadways. Many Moro women become prostitutes; others married Christian men. The impact of war is also disastrous to children. Moro children are prone to violence. Poverty forced many school-age children to join parents to eke out a living or stay home to take care of small kids.
On the other hand, the MNLF in particular and the Bangsa Moro in general, consider the war, inspite its disastrous impact, both in terms of lives and properties lost, as an initial victory of the struggle. This is so, because the soon-to-be-signed Tripoli Agreement was a formal written document which made the Philippine government recognize the Moro people's right to self-determination.
The Marcos government and the infamous Tripoli Agreement
The Marcos government was pressured from both within the country and outside to stop the costly war. The war has become known in Muslim countries especially the OIC (Organization of Islamic Conference). The government was spending big amounts of money to sustain the war. Investors were shying away and parents of soldiers who died in the war were showing concern over the death of their sons in a war where there is no winner but only losers.
All these pressures made the Marcos government sign an agreement with the MNLF known as the Tripoli Agreement of 1976. The agreement was aimed at providing a political negotiated settlement to the Moro problem through the grant of autonomy to the Muslims in the Southern Philippines. The government insisted on a plebiscite to settle the territories of the autonomous government as allegedly provided for in the agreement.
The MNLF did not recognize the result of the plebiscite, thus the negotiations bogged down. In the meantime, Marcos won over many of the MNLF ranks through various forms of attraction, ranging from amnesty to luxurious government posts. He pursued the creation of two administrative autonomous regions. This was reminiscent of the province set up under the colonial American regime. Another legacy was the creation of the Muslim Affairs Office directly under the Office of the President. All these were meant to appease the Moro people. Amid all these government programs, the armed struggle continued, though quietly.
A splittist group within the ranks of the MNLF broke away and formed what later would be known as the MILF (Moro Islamic Liberation Front). The MILF, which is dominated by the Maguindaons, is asserting Islamic ideology as distint from the nationalist tendency of the MNLF, although both are for the implementation of the Tripoli Agreement. The MILF is continuously building up its organized and armed strength.
The Cory Aquino policies to the Moro problem
Under the Aquino government, another attempt at negotiated settlement was made with the MNLF. The focus of the negotiation was also the Tripoli Agreement. But before anything could be agreed upon, the new Philippine Constitution was ratified. The talks bogged down.
The Constitution provides for a commission to draft an Organic Act that would shape the autonomous government in the region. This has become the legal basis for the creation of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindaqnao (ARMM). Four provinces out of 13 provinces voted to join. This is far from what the Tripoli Agreement provides.
The ARMM is essentially an extension of the elite-dominated Congress. It has not lived up to the expectations of its constituents. It has not made any significant improvement both in the economic life of the people and their security. In fact, it has become a congregation of the Moro elite as an extension arm of the President. Worse, it has become a source of corruption and polarization of the Bangsa Moro.
The prospects of the ongoing peace talks with the Ramos government
The Ramos government also entered into peace negotiations with the MNLF. The agreement is to discuss the modalities of implementing the Tripoli Agreement. The MILF has declared a supportive stance and a wait-and-see posture to avoid any excuse form the government to derail the talks. The peace negotiation has been dragging on for two years. According to a government panel member, nothing substantial has been achieved except the exchange of proposals. Legally speaking, the Tripoli Agreement could not be implemented through an Executive Order. The Congress must amend or change the Organic Act and come up with a new law to implement the creation of an autonomous government. This pushes the Tripoli Agreement to the sideline.
As in the past two governments, the present government of Ramos is tied with the Constitution. In the meantime, some sectors of the population demand participation in the ongoing peace talks. Amidst optimism by both camps, many observers feel that the ongoing peace negotiations is a case of history repeating itself.
Emergence of new forces
In the meantime, while the MNLF and the government are talking peace, other armed groups are coming out. The MILF, with its growing strength, warns that "in the event the talks will collapse, it will pursue the struggle at all costs, as it will feel there is no more point of talking, saying they have no more choice except to return to the barrel of the gun."
Another group bannering the right to self-determination of the Bangsa Moro is the national democratic-inspired Moro Revolutionary Organization (MRO). The MRO, with undetermined strength, is demanding for equal participation in the ongoing peace talks with the government saying peace is the project of all.
The birth of Fundamentalism/Extremism?
Lately, another armed group espousing an Islamic state for the Muslims in the Philippines came to the picture. This is the Abu Sayyaf, which the government has accused of terrorism in Mindanao. The Abu Sayyaf, working for an Islamic state, is opposed to the ongoing peace talks between the MNLF and the government. The Abu Sayyaf is linked to international terrorism by the government. Since the emergence of the Abu Sayyaf (father of the sword/children of the sword) in southern Philippines in 1992, particularly in Basilan, Zamboanga, Sulu and Tawi-Tawi, the government authorities, in their desperate effort to stop the growth of this group, has raised the issue of Islamic fundamentalism, extremism or terrorism--a legacy of Western bigotry against Islam.
The government, responding to the atrocities of the Abu Sayyaf, has launched an all-out sawyer (war?) and repressive measures against Muslim religious groups in the country, including Pakistanis, Iranian and Arab nationals, on suspicion of supporting and sympathizing with the Abu Sayyaf.
Even Bangsa Moro Muslim missionaries engaged in active religious work are being surveilled and some have been arrested on suspicion of being Abu Sayyaf members.
Observers say that government authorities, in their efforts to dismantle the Abu Sayyaf, have linked Islamic fundamentalism or extremism in the Philippines to international terrorism in order to please the enemies of Islam and to demonize Islam through black propaganda.
However, some evidence would show that the carnage in Basilan and Zamboanga were purely the handiwork of criminal elements manipulated by the government. And also on the Ipil carnage, the Islamic Command Council, a breakaway faction of the MNLF, and the military were allegedly responsible.
The MNLF, MILF and other Moro organizations are one in denouncing the kidnappings, bombings and other forms of criminal acts. However, they also believe that such extremist option will continue to plague the Philippines for as long as the problems of the Moro people are ignored by the authorities.
Philippines 2000: Another threat to the Bangsa Moro struggle for self-determination
Like in the colonial periods, programs like agricultural colonies and settlement projects were established in Moroland in the guise of development. But all these were found to have worked against the interest and rights of the indigenous people.
The Philippines 2000 project of the Ramos government, which aims at industrializing the country to be at par with the other economic "tigers" of Asia, is viewed with antagonism by the Moro people. Like in the past, this can be another ploy, in the guise of development, to grab the ancestral lands of the Moro people to give way to infrastructure, road expansion, big industries and agricultural plantations, which will drive away the Bangsa Moro and the other indigenous communities. Despite opposition, ongoing construction of industrial sites are paving the way for the dislocation of Moro families in the South.
The Moro people are already starting to pay the costly price of industrialization. For example:
Some 22 poor families will be ejected in General Santos City to pave the way for the construction of a government Philippine Fisher ies Development Authority International Fishport;
Moro communities were demolished to con struct a park and a hotel for tourists;
Badjaos' homes were demolished to make way for the expansion of a wharf;
To construct an international fishport, homes of fisherfolk have to be demolished. Another community is to be demolished for the expan sion of international airport;
Even a cemetery was not spared, to give way for the construction of a shuttle bus terminal;
Staple crops have to give way to exportable crops at the expense of the poor people.
The Bangsamoro, not having enough capital, could not invest in big industries but merely provide a source of cheap labor.
Industrialization would pave the way for development aggression and would sidetrack the real roots of the Moro people's quest for self-determination. Philippines 2000 certainly is a grand design for a continuing effort to eliminate the basic rights and prerogatives of the Moro people from their ancestral land.
This would only facilitate the intrusion of foreign and local agricultural plantation, heavy industries and the like that would only drain the natural resources within the ancestral domain of the indigenous people.
Already, some countries from the Middle East are scouting around for land in the ARMM, particularly those within the site of Regional Industrial Centers, for agro-industrial plantation sites. Eventually, due to the high cost of farming and the lack of support from the government, the farmers will be enticed to sell their lands to foreign investors.
Tourism, which is an important package of industrialization, would be disastrous to the cultural life of the indigenous people. As foreign culture proliferates, acculturation among the local people would become easier.
Where and How are the Bangsa Moro: Their socio-economic situation
As the Bangsa Moro are pre-occupied in their war for survival, identity and nation-in-making, their economic life is becoming more difficult. In the hierarchy of poverty, the Bangsamoro belongs to the poorest of the poor with majority of them earning a living as peasant farmers and fisherfolk. Moro farmers generally suffer from low productivity due to lack of access to technology aside from lack of capitalization for farm inputs. This is not to mention pest-infestation, soil erosion and the increasingly longer dry spell due to the continuous denudation of the surrounding forests. The drying up and pollution of the rivers have likewise deprived Moro farmers with reliable irrigation systems and safe water.
The lack of support from government in the form of subsidies and credit facilities has forced them to turn to local traders who subject them to usurious practices. In remote barangays, where there are no farm-to-market roads and where there is no immediate buyer nor storage facilities, crops are sometimes left to rot. Those who manage to transport their crops to the market are likewise at the mercy of traders who often underprice their products.
Among the Moro fisherfolk, the incursion of foreign trawlers, mainly Japanese and Taiwanese, results in a poor yield because of the depletion of marine resources in the region. To compete with the giant vessels, small fisherfolk often resort to cyanide fishing and other disastrous means of catching fish.
To add insult to injury, many Moros are hired as rice planters by Christian families. During harvest, they go back to gather the palay hulls and sort out the grain from the straw. In congested areas in urban areas, they are sidewalk vendors, manual laborers, pedicab drivers and vegetable vendors. Prostitution has become a source of employment despite its being prohibited by Islam.
Moro women have to join their spouses in the farm or in fishing. Hundreds of thousands of them are domestic helpers in the Middle East. Many come home with horrifying stories. School-age children have to take care of the small kids. Malnourishment and high mortality rate are found in dominantly Muslim communities, especially in the rural areas.
Five of the thirteen poorest provinces in the Philippines are populated mainly by the Moros. And yet, the same provinces are vulnerable to unstable peace and order conditions caused by sporadic armed clashes between Moro armed groups and the revolutionary forces on the one hand, and the AFP, on the other hand. Thousands of Moro evacuees are still languishing in refugee centers.
The perennial problems of dislocation
The Moro people started to experience evacuation since the latter part of the '60s. This has culminated in the '70s during the height of the war against the Marcos regime. A lull was created after the signing of the Tripoli Agreement in December 23, 1976. During these periods, a ceasefire agreement was signed between the MNLF and the government. It was indeed a breathing space for the Bangsa Moro who had been economically and politically displaced by the war.
When the peace talks bogged down, the tension started again, though evacuation was not as frequent as before. This situation prevailed all throughout the Aquino government until 3 years ago when a renewed militarization took place against kidnapping syndicates and against the MILF in Maguindanao who opposed the construction of a dam that would deprive the local inhabitants of their rightful claims over their ancestral lands, and the Abu Sayyaf in the Zamboanga, Basilan and Sulu areas of Western Mindanao.
In all of these military operations, thousands of Moro civilians had to flee to safer places. Hundreds of thousands worth of properties were lost. There were many casualties on both sides and there were also many civilians who became casualties of crossfire between the Moro armed groups and the military. The situation became another burdern to the already miserable life of many Bangsa Moro.
The Moro people's response
The Bangsa Moro people's reactions vary. The traditional political leaders emphasize maintaining loyalty with the Philippine constitution and cooperating with the government. Those in government positions are either silent or are for the status quo.
The religious leaders give emphasis to spiritual enrichment to overcome human problems in the homeland. To be obedient to God is their battlecry.
The MNLF is engaged in peace talks with the government. The MILF is in a wait-and-see stance while doing heavy indoctrination and spreading the concept of Islamic government. Another Moro armed group is the MRO, whose activities combine education and guerrilla formation. The Abu Sayyaf is also building up its forces and strength.
Amid all these responses by the armed Moro groups, the traditional leaders and those in the government, are the NGOs which combine education work with direct services and advocacy. In a span of a decade, more NGOs have been organized in Moro areas doing literacy work, socio-economic activities, community-organizing and capability-building among organized communities. The challenge is great considering various threats, including that of being labeled as rebels or their supporters.
The need for collective action: The task of solidarity
The peoples in the Philippines have shared a common history of struggle against colonial aggression and national oppression.
The problem of poverty, illiteracy and oppression and exploitation, while being heavily felt by the indigenous people, are also common to majority Filipinos. We also have a common desire to be free from the pangs of poverty, ill-health and oppression. We have the same dream of a better life. All these are binding factors that calls for eightened solidarity among the oppressed people, on one hand, and between the oppressed people and concerned people of the First World countries, as is the case in Europe. Along this line, the Moro people view the present solidarity between the Filipinos and the people in Europe with great appreciation.
It suggests, however, that such solidarity be extended too to struggling indigenous peoples in the Philippines considering their distinct culture, way of life and perspective of society. This would, therefore, entail a thorough study of the life and history of the Moro people, their culture, and their dreams. Towards achieving a common goal, the success of the Moro struggle will be the success of the Filipino struggle. The success of the struggle of the oppressed nations will be the success of solidarity.
Areas of Concerns
Solidarity work can consider the following as its areas of concern in dealing with the issue of the Moro people and other indigenous people of the Philippines:
The broad issue of the right to self-determination which ranges from ancestral claims to demands for a meaningful autonomous set-up;
Programs of Moro NGOs and other indigenous peoples related to the protection
Programs related to the welfare of women and children, especially those in the Moro areas and other indigenous peoples' communities;
Programs for exchange of information and for exposures;
Programs that can respond to here-and-now needs of the indigenous people in the Philippines.
Thank you and more power to solidarity. May your tribe increase.
(http://www.philsol.nl/solcon/Guiamel-95.htm)
Muslim-Christian Relations in the Philippines: Redefining the Conflict
Written by Prof. Datu Amilusin A. Jumaani
28 October 2000
My Brothers and Sisters in Humanity
My Brothers and Sisters in Islam
Distinguished Peace Builders
About a couple of months ago, relations between the Muslims and the Christians in the Philippines have once again been provoked into a confrontational stance with the problem over the Moro Islamic Liberation Front’s (MILF) armed movement for an independent Islamic state in the South and the audacity of the Abu Sayyaf for hostage rampage. While these may seem to be a problem on peace and order, the side effects of an economy on a downturn, they nonetheless trigger an alarm that it is not “all quiet at the southern front” to borrow a line. This means, something of the disturbing part of the past is being disturbed once more. What is again being stirred murky is the regard of the Muslims against the Christian Filipinos and vice-versa.
The recidivism in the Muslim-Christian encounter in the country has raised a major question whether the solution or the line of action taken to resolve the so called “Muslim problem” is tenable or not. In this respect, the national leadership as well as the other power blocs believe that whatever infirmity or shortcomings there are in the solution, that is, the 1996 Peace Agreement between the Philippine Government and the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) particularly on the establishment and operation of autonomy in Muslim Mindanao, is mainly a matter of effective management. It is understandable why the central administration of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) has been pressured to answer serious allegations on irregularities in handling development funds and other financial assistance for reconstruction and rehabilitation.
The government is strongly cloaked with political as well as moral authority to place the ARMM Governor under a compromising position, himself, having been a principal signatory to the 1996 Peace Agreement, and to a greater extent, the 1996 Peace Agreement is a carefully worked-out solution binding and perfect; that whatever “failures” or discontentment that would arise is solely a question of the efficiency and effectivity of the discharge of administrative function and responsibility.
It is common knowledge that the Muslim problem in the Philippines dates back to colonial times of the 16th Century of the Spanish Conquistadors. In between the episodes of more than three hundred years of warfare, peace treaties were made and more frequently so as the colonialo rule drew closer to an end. So was the case with the succeeding American occupation and in the period of Philippine Independence from 1945 to the present. In all, treaties were nothing but a military strategy to bring temporary lull to the massive toll in lives and properties only to resume in greater intensity of casualties and reinforcing the antagonism deeper in history.
Quite regrettably, the present situation is caught in the perpetuation of the conditions and circumstances of the past conflicts. If ever there is a point of difference between the past and present experience, it is mainly on the change in background scene but not in the perception, understanding, approach and method in addressing the problem.
Certainly, humanity is celebrating the era of globalization that harks upon a universal embrace of the ideals of democracy, of humanization, and of self-determination. Nothing could be more appealing and persuasive than to consider the Muslim problem in the context of these ideals. Thus, armed with these hallmarks of contemporary or advanced civility, the national leadership endorsed the problem to the “people” who, in turn, must also have the final work in accepting or rejecting the solution. Such was the fate of the Organic Act for the establishment of the autonomous region in Muslim Mindanao and the 1996 Peace Agreement. And such is the way it would be defended in rationalizing any extreme measures designed to effect the pacification of the South. In a dictum, the people have spoken with the divine will - vox populi, vox dei.
Countries in Asia, Africa, the Middle East, and the Americans have their own tale, their heroes in the course of their struggle to regain their independence from Western powers. Throughout the colonial period, the policy of aggression and the machinery of conquest reached the limit of what cruelty could inflict because it was morally right, because it was the responsibility of the materially advanced Western societies to “civilize” these parts of the human race who seemed to have defied the law of social evolution. There was no voice of the people to be heeded at that time, just the thundering guns and shrewd diplomacy to forge a document of outright victory and of surrender. Military officers and political figures stood tall to take the credits for citation as well as for the judgement of history. It was a time when individuals were prepared to answer for their actions. Today, who is there of the “people” to bear the responsibility or take the blame? None. Because supra-collective sin or crime is unthinkable. Therefore, the “people” are right and those who go against the people are necessarily wrong. Such is what is happening now.
The Muslim problem in the Philippines articulates substantially how the dominance and superiority of the Christianized majority could be rationalized as presented earlier. There is no equivocation on this as the roots of the conflict situation explain how the coutnry was anointed to inherit the colonial cultures, perpetuating its perception and attitudes towards the centuries-old adversary of its Spanish master from thereon. It is thus irony to claim the Organic Act on Muslim Mindanao and the 1996 Peace Agreement as solutions whereby they simply disguise or rationalize a state of colonial relations. Both the constitutional provision on autonomy and the mechanics of implementation incorporated in the 1996 Peace Agreement are mere overlay of the national bureaucracy. What seems to be the “autonomous” feature of this agreement is that Muslims are employed in key positions as well as the rank and file of agencies of the government. But even the manpower requirements of the ARMM are not 100% recruited from the Muslim population; non-Muslim (Christians) are given the privilege to occupy high-level positions as is the case of the Special Zone of Peace and Development (SZOPAD) which is equally composed of non-Muslims in its highest policy-making body. The supposed “special” status of the autonomous regional government is illusory, considering that major bureaucratic functions are already devolved to local government units throughout the country.
What can be gleaned from the structure and operations of the ARMM and the SZOPAD is that it provides the Muslims the opportunity to run the machinery of government, the very mode in which they are kept from realizing their aspiratins as a distinct segment in the national polity. In effect, autonomy is an instrument through which the Muslims are conscripted to further legitimize the so-called colonial relationship. Lured by the prospects of good life, a deliverance from poverty and the miseries of war, it is consequential to have them fighting out for positions in the autonomous government and its subsidiary agencies. On the other hand, the government is keen on institutionalizing autonomy by expanding its territorial scope from the existing four provinces (Lanao del Sur, Sultan Kudarat, Sulu, and Tawi-Tawi) to a number that would somehow impress its commitment to the earlier Tripoli Accord on the composition of the autonomous region of 13 provinces.
As has been noted, there is little change, if at all, in the perception and understanding of the Muslim problem. This is true to both parties in the conflict. Nevertheless, since the Philippine government is run by the majority and has the resources at its disposal to effect any policy or strategy to seriously resolve the issue, the burden weighs heavily on its side. Time and again there has always been an emphasis on sincerity in the peace negotiations and the insistence upon genuine autonomy. Whatever or however this may be interpreted, it lays down a premise that sincerity and genuineness are left to be desired.
In Defense of Territorial Integrity and Sovereignty
What the past and present Philippine political leadership, or the Filipinos in general, have been duty bound to uphold is the territorial integrity of the country and sovereignty. This is, of course, the preamble of every state or nation. There is no challenge or trouble if the citizenry is homogenous. But where a part of the state is alientated it, too, invokes the same principle of territorial dominion and sovereignty. Such is the case with the Muslims in the Philippines whose history has taken a different and divergent route from the rest of the Filipinos. The facts are established in the long list of the so-called “Moro wars” fought fiercely and persistently by the Muslims to stave off colonial agression, in contrast to the resignation of the native inhabitants of Luzon and the Visayas to foreign rule. In the process, the Muslims retained their faith and culture while the Filipinos were absorbed into religious and cultural western mould. As it were, the flow of Philippine history diverged into two rivers, each seeking its own path, each fulfilling its journey towards a particular destiny.
The American occupaton of the Philippines defined and ensured its territory and its sovereignty and the instrumentalities of government that would render then form and substance. Despite the trappings of a modern state, however, the country is internally divided between North and South, between Muslim and Christians. The conflict in Southern Philippines the past three decades is suggestively conclusive that territorial integrity does not make a nation and no sovereignty is absolute.
The intrasigence on the territorial integrity of the country, archipelagic as it is, greatly influenced government policy and programs towards the Muslims. Filipinization and later on national integration became popular bywords. Although there had been some degree of modification and adjustment made after one failure to another, the bottom line has always been the idealism on one undivided country - Isang Bansa, Isang Diwa (One country, One Spirit). The autonomous government for Muslim areas in the south is expressive of how far the government has seriously attempted at fixing permanently the concept of territorial integrity. This need be so as a sine-qua-non to complementary programs that would draw the Muslims into the mainstream of body politic with the rest of the Filipinos. As with the previous programs on national integration, the establishment of autonomous region for Muslim areas is seemingly having difficulty in terms of administrative operations and the dramatic popular acceptability in which the national referendum for the Organic Act on Autonomy for Muslim Mindanao was designed to generate. Following the foregoing argument, autonomy is a political solution to guarantee the territorial integrity of the country as against the imperatives of self-determination.
There is a strong psychological barrier in coming up with a redefinition of territorial integrity in the conflict situation. The concept itself is the crux of the problem and is a byproduct of colonial rule. The physical factor of geography requires a singularity of elements that make up a society; thus, one country, one citizenship, one law, one language, etc. It thus became an imposed necessity where by rationalization or justification could be made on actions tha tmay likely be in violation of human rights. The consequences of this perception are evident in the present conflict in Mindanao and even earlier on.
By redefinition, a point is being raised whether the survival of the country means first and foremost territorial integrity, or should that integrity be more relevant and constructive in the context of social solidarity? By nature’s incomprehensible workings, the Philippines is fragmented into 7,000 islands, a physical feature that is definite and permanent, nurturing in turn distinct markings of tribes, languages, cultures, etc. whose diversity and distance is beyond reach of legislated laws and bureaucratic policies. Where the inhabitants feel, however, that they have something valuable to share and cherish, the deep divided is a matter of crossing over.
The Homeland: Birthright and the receding domain.
In the impasse on the territorial question on the areas of Muslim autonomy in the construct of the Tripoli Agreement, the American definition of the Moro province, that is, the 13 provinces was finally accepted as basis. Nevertheless, the Moro domain as expressed in the said agreement was never implemented nor the agreement itself; instead, it was further reduced into an insignificant size with only 4 of the 13 provinces finally adopted as the true area of autonomy in the Organic Act for Muslim Autonomy. This was, of course, determined by a referendum and thus became a basis for determining where Muslims form the majority of the population. This also proved that the Muslims have been misled to think that they have a right over the 13 provinces as initially stated in the Tripoli Agreement. There was a good reason to discredit the American survey, as its rule is long past gone. And as the problem is current, then the factor of population must be established within the proper time frame.
The Moro Province of the American administration encompassed the areas that were identified to be either major Muslim settlement6s or where their control have thus extended at the time when the Philippine population is still polarized into two major groupings - the Moros and the Indios (the Christianized Filipinos). It was the Moro Province as the Americans assessed and accurately the distinct history, culture, and religious beliefs of hte people in stark contrast to the larger Filipino community. The Americans even considered of having a special status for the Moro Province under their stewardship in the event of the granting of independence to the Filipinos, fearing that a time will come when there would be bloodshed. The Americans were right all along.
With the granting of independence of the Filipinos, the demography of the Moro Province was increasingly altered by the unabated influx of settlers from Luzon and the Visayas. Until today, domestic migration contines as the prospects of a better life in the so-called “Land of Promise” are there, providing an alternative to the growing poverty in most of the Christian areas. The “Land of Promise” was actually a campaign slogan for populating the vast areas of the Moro Province with non-native inhabitants. In a matter of 50 years, the once large Muslim provinces of Cotabato, Lanao, Davao, Zamboanga Peninsula, and Basilan are now inhabited mostly by Christians.
The systematic and deliberate resettlement program of the government in Muslim areas is nothing less than a classic colonial strategy - that of colonization by settlement. This is but necessary in fixing the concept of territorial integrity and that of sovereignty residing in the people. The resettlement program was reinforced by the involvement of the Church, the presence of military forces, and the economic support provided by both private and public financial institutions as well as the organizational resources of non-government entities. The Muslims were left to tend to themselves. Poor and mostly uneducated, they lost their precious lands whose ownership stands on tradition as against documents now in the hands of the settlers. Dispossessed and economically maimed, the natives of Moroland find themselves reliving the conflict they have known all their lives against foreign incursions. The “enemy” now may no longer be the “white men”, but they are seen as having the saving purpose of subjugating them under a law and a culture they have fought for more than three hundred years.
The Media: Objectivity vs. Propaganda
Prejudices and discrimination between the Muslims and the Christianshave been ingrained as permanent as a birthmark. Calling the Muslims as Moros was an effective means in rallying the Filipinos to fight on the side of the Spaniards in their military campaigns against the former. So was the labeling of the Christianized Filipinos as Bisaya (meaning, slaves) by the Moros. Little has improved in the way the two communities regard each other with derision and contempt up to today. Nonetheless, there had been attempts at improving the situation prompted by the aggravating conflict in the 70s. Information dissemination was intensively carried out through the media run on Muslim history, culture, and religion, and a number of scholarly studies in explaining the forces that contributed to Muslim-Christian misunderstandings. Institutional programs were also undertaken such as the construction of a Muslim community (mostly Muslim professionals) in Manila, mosques, special schools on Islamic Studies, an Islamic Bank (Amanah Bank), and the Ministry for Muslim Affairs. Information campaign and education proved to be quite effective in easing the tension especially on the part of the Muslims who saw some degree of restitution in the government for its longstanding neglect and discriminatino.
As the conflict began to gradually lull and subside, the enthusiasm on almost all of these programs consequently waned. The housing projects for Muslims lost their exclusivity, the Ministry was cut down to size to a mere office, and interests on Islamic culture and tradition no longer qualified for research and other scholarly studies. All these are presumed to be now under the responsibility of in fact the very purpose of establishing the ARMM. The deep-seated misunderstanding requires the greater involvement of the country’s entire population. In a sense, it is a national concern rather than just a regional one.
How the prejudices and discrimination are dyed fast in the national fabric is pretty much evident in the way the words Muslim and Islam have been used, as there are events or issues that directly bear upon the Muslims, individually or collectively. The caution that was raised in the indiscriminate use of the word Muslim or Islam in media reports and other write-ups is now being abandoned. The stereotype concepts on Muslim and Islam are once again reinforced as the media tell tales of the encounters with the MILF and the Abu Sayyaf. Extremist, fundamentalist, secessionist, rebel, lost command, gangster, terrorist, smuggler, hold-upper, kidnapper are prefixed with the word Muslim or Islam, projecting the Muslims all the more as unreasonable, barbaric and violent. Whether this is a deliberate and conscious act or not, it is clear to have a presumption that there is a hint at a sloganeering or labeling to rally once again the Christians against the Muslims with regard to the outbreak of hostilities in Muslim Mindanao between the armed forces and the Muslim groups. In the South, another chapter in the history of conflict unfolds in resurrection.
Media’s persuasive power is most efficient and effective in creating a collective consciousness and action. It would be taking a great deal of risks not to have control of the mass media, or at least some measure of censorship, in as far as the conflict in Southern Philippines is concerned. As the media are in the hands of the Christians and some of them are practically owned by the government or have investments of the church and other Christian religious groups, it logically explains why mass media are out with suggestive derogatory use of Muslim and Islam in the headlines and the stories.
It may be said that the Philippine media are acting out of bounds. It is to be pointed out, however, that the responsibility is directed towards the national majority, not the minority. As has been mentioned, the Philippine political leadership stands on its policy to integrate the Muslims into the mainstream of Filipino life. It need not be stated, but the responsibility of the media is to see to it that the process of integration could serve its end. What happens next follows what have been earlier on premised. It can be a vicious cycle unless a radical perception of Muslim-Christian relations in the country could be initiated and sustained.
Concluding Remarks
A noted Muslim Filipino historian, Dr. Cesar Adib Majul, in his major work, “The Muslims in the Philippines”, puts forward an idea on the phenomenon of “juramentado”, loosely translated as “running amock” in the perception of the Spaniards and the Americans, respectively, as an act of sacrifice in defense of Islam and the community of faithfuls.
Towards the close of the 19th Century, the Sultanates (the political institution of the Muslims in the Philippines) were considerably weakened by the long-drawn wars and were hardly in a position to keep up with the defenses against foreign incursions. There were compromises and concessions at this ebbing point that were regarded by the people as an abandonment of the responsibility on the part of the sultan to protect the community. It then became an individual obligation to ward off the presence of the foreigners and in most cases it ended up with a personal appointment with death, something that is believed to be recompensed with paradise for facing up to the agression of the non-believers. Quite a number of these juramentados became legendary, inspiring each generation on what it takes to have faith and to remain faithful to history.
The juramentado phenomenon waned in time and the Americans pursued an education campaign for the Muslims. They believed that through education a change could be expected from the Muslims, that is, pacified in the manner the rest of the Filipinos were successfully molded in the ways of western culture. The members of the royalty were the principal targest of the American educational campaign. Pangian Tarhata Kiram, a princess and heir to the Sulu Sultanate, was sent to the United States for schooling. In the United States she was fashioned as an American as she could be. When she came home, she spat the bubble gum and again picked up the habit of chewing bettle nut. It did seem to the princess that to swallow the ways of the “white men” was to betray her own roots.
In the changing economic, political and social structure brought about by the dominance of the Filipino order, the Muslims were gradually encouraged to get an education as a survival measure. The Philippine government seized the opportunity and intensified its programs on educating the Muslims especially in granting scholarships and other incentive benefits. While children of most of the well-to-do families enrolled in this program, majority of the poor population kept out of school. However, no sooner, attration to education reached its point of dissatisfaction. Some Muslim intellectuals and political leaders had uneasiness over the contents of the curriculum, suspicious above all of what harm it could inflict on the coming generations as to their existence and identity, and above all, their being Muslims.
Where the institution of the juramentado provided a cross-over in the defense of the Muslim communities after the demise of the sultanate, the birth of the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) may be regarded as a cross-over of the former. In summary, the MNLF’s peace negotiation with the Philippine government triggered a successive line of crossover defense with the declaration of “jihad” by the MILF and the yet confused but real threat of the Abu Sayyaf. The pattern of resistance that has emerged from the centuries of conflict may became all the more visibly clear in the future given the consistency in the perception and understanding of the problem. The events following the disintegration of Russia and Yugoslavia put in parallel perspective the context within which the Muslim situation in the Philippines could take a turn.
Consistently, the prevailing view on the Muslim problem is influenced by dominant modern day thoughts on economics wherein human existence is subjected to pure function of material progress. The establishment of the ARMM, the SZOPAD, the integration of former MNLF forces into the Philippine Armed Forces, are directed towards teh quantified satisfaction of a problem that has antedated contemporary governments and lifestyles.
Though the pangs of poverty contribute to social unrest, there is still much to human aspirations aside from basic needs for survival. This is a crucial point in which the Muslim communities in the Philippines have been struggling to strike a balance between the “passions of the earth and the desires of heaven”, so to speak. Every amount of rehabilitation and reconstruction funds for the development of Muslim Mindanao has come to naught in pacifying the conflict situation for the simple reason of lack of appreciation of the Weltanschauung of the Muslims by the national polity.
The quantified understanding of life is insisted by virtue of its being functional to the majority, that is, the larger Christian population. The saying, “a sauce for the goose is the sauce for the gander” appears to be the solution relentlessly pursued since it logically fits into the mold of what constitutes territorial integrity, the meaning of sovereignty, the supremacy of the constitution, one language to stand for a nation, and the definition of democracy as a rule by the majority.
Majority-Minority: Setting the right equation
It is to be noted that in the 1996 Peace Agreement, in the operations of the SZOPAD, in the socio-economic upliftment of the Southern Philippines, the thrusts of government programs and projects and those of donor countries encompass the non-Muslims (Christians that include the Lumads - natives). It is to be noted, too, that the conflict in the South concerns the plight of the Muslims who have been long neglected and long been discriminated. In short, this is a minority problem. It is thus to be treated as such in a manner that the solution addresses primarily the concerns of the Muslims without prejudice to the Christians in the area who already belong to the majority in the first place. It is a situation in which the majority (the national government) is offering assistance to the minority not only in terms of development projects but more importantly the means and the opportunities for empowerment to rise to the level of competitiveness with the majority. In a sense, it is to establish a right equation in the majority-minority relationship. Sadly, this is not what is happening in the South: the equation is kept lopsided. So the problem persists more to the liking of the solutions being undertaken. One Muslim Filipino writer puts this in a perspective: “The development and peace for Muslim is an offering, a gift by the majority to the minority: it is in bad taste when the majority still gets a share of its own gift.”
For the moment, the country’s political leadership disallows any change or modification in what it perceives as a “dismemberment” of the Philippine Republic. As if this is not enough, it imposes homogeneity of the Filipinos as a nation in spite of the existence of multi-cultural and multi-religious communities, which altogether prove the contrary. Nowhere does this come closer to the truth with the plight of the Muslims.
Given the position and the disposition of the Philippine government vis-a-vis the Muslims in the country, the present conflict in Muslim Mindanao is essentially a direct statement on how colonial relations have persisted into the modern times. The claim of the Muslim political groups for independence could only be the most viable option to break away from such a relationship. On the one hand, the acceptance of the Muslim political leadership, particularly the MNLF, and the ongoing peace negotiations with the MILF for autonomy is strongly indicative of how they could allow their existence within the territorial integrity of the country provided they exercise control over their lives as well as their destiny. Thus, independence is perceived by the Muslims as a matter of substance in opposition to the government’s political definition of it, that is, the existence of another state.
There are a number of governments that have intermittently confronted problems on minorities and have resolved or contained them in the course of time. But where there is the problem on Muslims as the minority, the issue dies hard. Not only does the problem involve religious sensitivities but more importantly on the reconciliation of two systems of law – one that is secular oriented and the other immutably sacred. And in the Philippine situation, the meaning of territorial integrity and sovereignty leaves no room for another system of law such as the Shari’ah. Just like autonomy, the incorporation of the Muslim Personal and Family Law into the Philippine Law serves only to reinforce the sovereignty of the latter. This is the main point of conflict, and resiliency of both sides could only serve to induce and sustain a breaking point with violence.
Altering the Equation: Encounter of Civilizations
During the height of the Muslim armed struggle under the Marcos era, a part of the major counter-insurgency steps taken was the acknowledgement of Islam as national heritage, an indispensable element in the search for national identity and nation-building. There was likewise a heightened consciousness regarding the Muslims not just as mere numerical entities but warmly qualified as being significant minority. What could have been a fresh look at Muslim-Christian relationships was marred by the fact that the advocate of such a radical view was no less unacceptable than the idea itself. It was all too difficult to go along with the policy Marcos was espousing at that time, as he was having an acute contradiction in his delusions to hold on to power. Besides, while the recognition of Islam and the role of Muslims in Philippine history, past and present, stood on good merits, they were only good in serving the ends of the military campaign against the Muslim armed struggle. And like the rest of the projects and programs on making up for neglect of the Muslim communities, the idea just died out to insignificance.
Perhaps, what had been initiated by Marcos propagandists on Islam and the Muslims may be reconsidered under the present situation. To a large extent, the idea succeeded in becalming the storms of war and appealed to most of the educated, leaders, and professionals among the Muslims who were convinced of the kind of justice that has finally come around. Though there may have been some lessons learned from the “tricks” of the Martial Law period, the idea itself holds a great amount of truth in rendering a finer perspective on the status of the Muslims in the country.
As the military options, going hand in hand with impact development projects, have not resolved entirely the Muslim problem, it becomes a challenge to take on “the road less travelled”. And since approaches and methods are consequent of perceptions and attitudes, it is thus quite an exercise of objectivity to take into account rethinking or re-feeling of the matter at hand as the first of the imperatives in the efforts to find a lasting and comprehensive resolution to the Mindanao conflict.
In consideration of the foregoing proposition, what is necessary is to take a bold step in challenging the traditional view that Islam is a mere punctuation in the pages of Philippine history. Despite the earlier contacts of the natives with Islam of more than two hundred years prior to the coming of the Europeans, there is little said and the least of appreciation on its contribution to the making of a civilization in this part of the world. Indeed, it is sad to note that even the most respected Filipino scholars and historians have one page to tell of Islam that is often dismissed as an accident of the historical forces, bestowing as it were greater importance to more ancient religious experiences in the Indo-Malaysian world.
The conflict situation in Muslim Mindanao is proof of how Islam has come to seal the social transformation of the people who have accepted it as a reference point in their lives. To view Islam as a mere event in the unfolding of human history through time is to take on a perspective that it could be relegated to the past and may only be considered in as far as it serves the interests of the present disposition.
It is often said that Islam is “a way of life”. It is a popularly accepted description but hardly understood. “A way of life” is taken to mean as valid and as applicable to other modes of living and understanding life. It is suggestive of the possibility that Islam could somehow be altered in time. This is not hypothetical nor a presumption. Efforts have been undertaken to introduce such change in Islam. But recent events in the Muslim world have proved that Islam possesses a quality of permanence and by this token it directs or determines the dynamics of history, rather than be swept away and buried in the layers of human existence.
By “way of life” carries with it the notion of Islam as a “civilizing force” that is universal in time and place. The restlessness of Muslim communities throughout the world particularly in the Southern Philippines is borne by the immutable Islamic principles on the kind of civilization that needs to be created in the contemporary context.
The tensions, violent and destructive as they have been, underlie the basic failure in appreciating Islam as the normative element of culture and civilization. This may also be the situation in which non-Muslim societies find themselves in, as they inter-relate with other communities, especially with the Muslims. In this manner, the common ground of the encounter is forced upon religion wherein even the commonalities are in themselves a cause for the differences. This is not to say, however, that such efforts at inter-faith dialogue is short of the measure in forging better understanding and goodwill among the religious communities. On the contrary, this is a major factor in considering a more constructive encounter, that is, on the level of culture or civilization. On this level, the experience could dwell on a synthesis of new ideas, of alternatives in technologies that secure the development of mankind in an atmosphere of peaceful co-existence and cooperation. The Golden Age of Islam in the Middle Ages has attained this level. There is optimism on a similar level of encounter as the quest for world peace and security continues.
In the Philippines, the challenge lies not in integration of a minority into the mainstream life of the majority. It is to effect a synthesis, of acknowledging the element of Islam in the evolution of the Filipino identity and a national spirit and the crucial role of the Muslims in the struggle to keep the freedom of every Filipino.
This may be an idea that may take a long way to realize, but as civilization is a manifestation of the peak of human perfection, all roads will lead ultimately towards this destiny.
(http://www.philsol.nl/A01a/Jumaani-redefining-oct00.htm)
28 October 2000
My Brothers and Sisters in Humanity
My Brothers and Sisters in Islam
Distinguished Peace Builders
About a couple of months ago, relations between the Muslims and the Christians in the Philippines have once again been provoked into a confrontational stance with the problem over the Moro Islamic Liberation Front’s (MILF) armed movement for an independent Islamic state in the South and the audacity of the Abu Sayyaf for hostage rampage. While these may seem to be a problem on peace and order, the side effects of an economy on a downturn, they nonetheless trigger an alarm that it is not “all quiet at the southern front” to borrow a line. This means, something of the disturbing part of the past is being disturbed once more. What is again being stirred murky is the regard of the Muslims against the Christian Filipinos and vice-versa.
The recidivism in the Muslim-Christian encounter in the country has raised a major question whether the solution or the line of action taken to resolve the so called “Muslim problem” is tenable or not. In this respect, the national leadership as well as the other power blocs believe that whatever infirmity or shortcomings there are in the solution, that is, the 1996 Peace Agreement between the Philippine Government and the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) particularly on the establishment and operation of autonomy in Muslim Mindanao, is mainly a matter of effective management. It is understandable why the central administration of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) has been pressured to answer serious allegations on irregularities in handling development funds and other financial assistance for reconstruction and rehabilitation.
The government is strongly cloaked with political as well as moral authority to place the ARMM Governor under a compromising position, himself, having been a principal signatory to the 1996 Peace Agreement, and to a greater extent, the 1996 Peace Agreement is a carefully worked-out solution binding and perfect; that whatever “failures” or discontentment that would arise is solely a question of the efficiency and effectivity of the discharge of administrative function and responsibility.
It is common knowledge that the Muslim problem in the Philippines dates back to colonial times of the 16th Century of the Spanish Conquistadors. In between the episodes of more than three hundred years of warfare, peace treaties were made and more frequently so as the colonialo rule drew closer to an end. So was the case with the succeeding American occupation and in the period of Philippine Independence from 1945 to the present. In all, treaties were nothing but a military strategy to bring temporary lull to the massive toll in lives and properties only to resume in greater intensity of casualties and reinforcing the antagonism deeper in history.
Quite regrettably, the present situation is caught in the perpetuation of the conditions and circumstances of the past conflicts. If ever there is a point of difference between the past and present experience, it is mainly on the change in background scene but not in the perception, understanding, approach and method in addressing the problem.
Certainly, humanity is celebrating the era of globalization that harks upon a universal embrace of the ideals of democracy, of humanization, and of self-determination. Nothing could be more appealing and persuasive than to consider the Muslim problem in the context of these ideals. Thus, armed with these hallmarks of contemporary or advanced civility, the national leadership endorsed the problem to the “people” who, in turn, must also have the final work in accepting or rejecting the solution. Such was the fate of the Organic Act for the establishment of the autonomous region in Muslim Mindanao and the 1996 Peace Agreement. And such is the way it would be defended in rationalizing any extreme measures designed to effect the pacification of the South. In a dictum, the people have spoken with the divine will - vox populi, vox dei.
Countries in Asia, Africa, the Middle East, and the Americans have their own tale, their heroes in the course of their struggle to regain their independence from Western powers. Throughout the colonial period, the policy of aggression and the machinery of conquest reached the limit of what cruelty could inflict because it was morally right, because it was the responsibility of the materially advanced Western societies to “civilize” these parts of the human race who seemed to have defied the law of social evolution. There was no voice of the people to be heeded at that time, just the thundering guns and shrewd diplomacy to forge a document of outright victory and of surrender. Military officers and political figures stood tall to take the credits for citation as well as for the judgement of history. It was a time when individuals were prepared to answer for their actions. Today, who is there of the “people” to bear the responsibility or take the blame? None. Because supra-collective sin or crime is unthinkable. Therefore, the “people” are right and those who go against the people are necessarily wrong. Such is what is happening now.
The Muslim problem in the Philippines articulates substantially how the dominance and superiority of the Christianized majority could be rationalized as presented earlier. There is no equivocation on this as the roots of the conflict situation explain how the coutnry was anointed to inherit the colonial cultures, perpetuating its perception and attitudes towards the centuries-old adversary of its Spanish master from thereon. It is thus irony to claim the Organic Act on Muslim Mindanao and the 1996 Peace Agreement as solutions whereby they simply disguise or rationalize a state of colonial relations. Both the constitutional provision on autonomy and the mechanics of implementation incorporated in the 1996 Peace Agreement are mere overlay of the national bureaucracy. What seems to be the “autonomous” feature of this agreement is that Muslims are employed in key positions as well as the rank and file of agencies of the government. But even the manpower requirements of the ARMM are not 100% recruited from the Muslim population; non-Muslim (Christians) are given the privilege to occupy high-level positions as is the case of the Special Zone of Peace and Development (SZOPAD) which is equally composed of non-Muslims in its highest policy-making body. The supposed “special” status of the autonomous regional government is illusory, considering that major bureaucratic functions are already devolved to local government units throughout the country.
What can be gleaned from the structure and operations of the ARMM and the SZOPAD is that it provides the Muslims the opportunity to run the machinery of government, the very mode in which they are kept from realizing their aspiratins as a distinct segment in the national polity. In effect, autonomy is an instrument through which the Muslims are conscripted to further legitimize the so-called colonial relationship. Lured by the prospects of good life, a deliverance from poverty and the miseries of war, it is consequential to have them fighting out for positions in the autonomous government and its subsidiary agencies. On the other hand, the government is keen on institutionalizing autonomy by expanding its territorial scope from the existing four provinces (Lanao del Sur, Sultan Kudarat, Sulu, and Tawi-Tawi) to a number that would somehow impress its commitment to the earlier Tripoli Accord on the composition of the autonomous region of 13 provinces.
As has been noted, there is little change, if at all, in the perception and understanding of the Muslim problem. This is true to both parties in the conflict. Nevertheless, since the Philippine government is run by the majority and has the resources at its disposal to effect any policy or strategy to seriously resolve the issue, the burden weighs heavily on its side. Time and again there has always been an emphasis on sincerity in the peace negotiations and the insistence upon genuine autonomy. Whatever or however this may be interpreted, it lays down a premise that sincerity and genuineness are left to be desired.
In Defense of Territorial Integrity and Sovereignty
What the past and present Philippine political leadership, or the Filipinos in general, have been duty bound to uphold is the territorial integrity of the country and sovereignty. This is, of course, the preamble of every state or nation. There is no challenge or trouble if the citizenry is homogenous. But where a part of the state is alientated it, too, invokes the same principle of territorial dominion and sovereignty. Such is the case with the Muslims in the Philippines whose history has taken a different and divergent route from the rest of the Filipinos. The facts are established in the long list of the so-called “Moro wars” fought fiercely and persistently by the Muslims to stave off colonial agression, in contrast to the resignation of the native inhabitants of Luzon and the Visayas to foreign rule. In the process, the Muslims retained their faith and culture while the Filipinos were absorbed into religious and cultural western mould. As it were, the flow of Philippine history diverged into two rivers, each seeking its own path, each fulfilling its journey towards a particular destiny.
The American occupaton of the Philippines defined and ensured its territory and its sovereignty and the instrumentalities of government that would render then form and substance. Despite the trappings of a modern state, however, the country is internally divided between North and South, between Muslim and Christians. The conflict in Southern Philippines the past three decades is suggestively conclusive that territorial integrity does not make a nation and no sovereignty is absolute.
The intrasigence on the territorial integrity of the country, archipelagic as it is, greatly influenced government policy and programs towards the Muslims. Filipinization and later on national integration became popular bywords. Although there had been some degree of modification and adjustment made after one failure to another, the bottom line has always been the idealism on one undivided country - Isang Bansa, Isang Diwa (One country, One Spirit). The autonomous government for Muslim areas in the south is expressive of how far the government has seriously attempted at fixing permanently the concept of territorial integrity. This need be so as a sine-qua-non to complementary programs that would draw the Muslims into the mainstream of body politic with the rest of the Filipinos. As with the previous programs on national integration, the establishment of autonomous region for Muslim areas is seemingly having difficulty in terms of administrative operations and the dramatic popular acceptability in which the national referendum for the Organic Act on Autonomy for Muslim Mindanao was designed to generate. Following the foregoing argument, autonomy is a political solution to guarantee the territorial integrity of the country as against the imperatives of self-determination.
There is a strong psychological barrier in coming up with a redefinition of territorial integrity in the conflict situation. The concept itself is the crux of the problem and is a byproduct of colonial rule. The physical factor of geography requires a singularity of elements that make up a society; thus, one country, one citizenship, one law, one language, etc. It thus became an imposed necessity where by rationalization or justification could be made on actions tha tmay likely be in violation of human rights. The consequences of this perception are evident in the present conflict in Mindanao and even earlier on.
By redefinition, a point is being raised whether the survival of the country means first and foremost territorial integrity, or should that integrity be more relevant and constructive in the context of social solidarity? By nature’s incomprehensible workings, the Philippines is fragmented into 7,000 islands, a physical feature that is definite and permanent, nurturing in turn distinct markings of tribes, languages, cultures, etc. whose diversity and distance is beyond reach of legislated laws and bureaucratic policies. Where the inhabitants feel, however, that they have something valuable to share and cherish, the deep divided is a matter of crossing over.
The Homeland: Birthright and the receding domain.
In the impasse on the territorial question on the areas of Muslim autonomy in the construct of the Tripoli Agreement, the American definition of the Moro province, that is, the 13 provinces was finally accepted as basis. Nevertheless, the Moro domain as expressed in the said agreement was never implemented nor the agreement itself; instead, it was further reduced into an insignificant size with only 4 of the 13 provinces finally adopted as the true area of autonomy in the Organic Act for Muslim Autonomy. This was, of course, determined by a referendum and thus became a basis for determining where Muslims form the majority of the population. This also proved that the Muslims have been misled to think that they have a right over the 13 provinces as initially stated in the Tripoli Agreement. There was a good reason to discredit the American survey, as its rule is long past gone. And as the problem is current, then the factor of population must be established within the proper time frame.
The Moro Province of the American administration encompassed the areas that were identified to be either major Muslim settlement6s or where their control have thus extended at the time when the Philippine population is still polarized into two major groupings - the Moros and the Indios (the Christianized Filipinos). It was the Moro Province as the Americans assessed and accurately the distinct history, culture, and religious beliefs of hte people in stark contrast to the larger Filipino community. The Americans even considered of having a special status for the Moro Province under their stewardship in the event of the granting of independence to the Filipinos, fearing that a time will come when there would be bloodshed. The Americans were right all along.
With the granting of independence of the Filipinos, the demography of the Moro Province was increasingly altered by the unabated influx of settlers from Luzon and the Visayas. Until today, domestic migration contines as the prospects of a better life in the so-called “Land of Promise” are there, providing an alternative to the growing poverty in most of the Christian areas. The “Land of Promise” was actually a campaign slogan for populating the vast areas of the Moro Province with non-native inhabitants. In a matter of 50 years, the once large Muslim provinces of Cotabato, Lanao, Davao, Zamboanga Peninsula, and Basilan are now inhabited mostly by Christians.
The systematic and deliberate resettlement program of the government in Muslim areas is nothing less than a classic colonial strategy - that of colonization by settlement. This is but necessary in fixing the concept of territorial integrity and that of sovereignty residing in the people. The resettlement program was reinforced by the involvement of the Church, the presence of military forces, and the economic support provided by both private and public financial institutions as well as the organizational resources of non-government entities. The Muslims were left to tend to themselves. Poor and mostly uneducated, they lost their precious lands whose ownership stands on tradition as against documents now in the hands of the settlers. Dispossessed and economically maimed, the natives of Moroland find themselves reliving the conflict they have known all their lives against foreign incursions. The “enemy” now may no longer be the “white men”, but they are seen as having the saving purpose of subjugating them under a law and a culture they have fought for more than three hundred years.
The Media: Objectivity vs. Propaganda
Prejudices and discrimination between the Muslims and the Christianshave been ingrained as permanent as a birthmark. Calling the Muslims as Moros was an effective means in rallying the Filipinos to fight on the side of the Spaniards in their military campaigns against the former. So was the labeling of the Christianized Filipinos as Bisaya (meaning, slaves) by the Moros. Little has improved in the way the two communities regard each other with derision and contempt up to today. Nonetheless, there had been attempts at improving the situation prompted by the aggravating conflict in the 70s. Information dissemination was intensively carried out through the media run on Muslim history, culture, and religion, and a number of scholarly studies in explaining the forces that contributed to Muslim-Christian misunderstandings. Institutional programs were also undertaken such as the construction of a Muslim community (mostly Muslim professionals) in Manila, mosques, special schools on Islamic Studies, an Islamic Bank (Amanah Bank), and the Ministry for Muslim Affairs. Information campaign and education proved to be quite effective in easing the tension especially on the part of the Muslims who saw some degree of restitution in the government for its longstanding neglect and discriminatino.
As the conflict began to gradually lull and subside, the enthusiasm on almost all of these programs consequently waned. The housing projects for Muslims lost their exclusivity, the Ministry was cut down to size to a mere office, and interests on Islamic culture and tradition no longer qualified for research and other scholarly studies. All these are presumed to be now under the responsibility of in fact the very purpose of establishing the ARMM. The deep-seated misunderstanding requires the greater involvement of the country’s entire population. In a sense, it is a national concern rather than just a regional one.
How the prejudices and discrimination are dyed fast in the national fabric is pretty much evident in the way the words Muslim and Islam have been used, as there are events or issues that directly bear upon the Muslims, individually or collectively. The caution that was raised in the indiscriminate use of the word Muslim or Islam in media reports and other write-ups is now being abandoned. The stereotype concepts on Muslim and Islam are once again reinforced as the media tell tales of the encounters with the MILF and the Abu Sayyaf. Extremist, fundamentalist, secessionist, rebel, lost command, gangster, terrorist, smuggler, hold-upper, kidnapper are prefixed with the word Muslim or Islam, projecting the Muslims all the more as unreasonable, barbaric and violent. Whether this is a deliberate and conscious act or not, it is clear to have a presumption that there is a hint at a sloganeering or labeling to rally once again the Christians against the Muslims with regard to the outbreak of hostilities in Muslim Mindanao between the armed forces and the Muslim groups. In the South, another chapter in the history of conflict unfolds in resurrection.
Media’s persuasive power is most efficient and effective in creating a collective consciousness and action. It would be taking a great deal of risks not to have control of the mass media, or at least some measure of censorship, in as far as the conflict in Southern Philippines is concerned. As the media are in the hands of the Christians and some of them are practically owned by the government or have investments of the church and other Christian religious groups, it logically explains why mass media are out with suggestive derogatory use of Muslim and Islam in the headlines and the stories.
It may be said that the Philippine media are acting out of bounds. It is to be pointed out, however, that the responsibility is directed towards the national majority, not the minority. As has been mentioned, the Philippine political leadership stands on its policy to integrate the Muslims into the mainstream of Filipino life. It need not be stated, but the responsibility of the media is to see to it that the process of integration could serve its end. What happens next follows what have been earlier on premised. It can be a vicious cycle unless a radical perception of Muslim-Christian relations in the country could be initiated and sustained.
Concluding Remarks
A noted Muslim Filipino historian, Dr. Cesar Adib Majul, in his major work, “The Muslims in the Philippines”, puts forward an idea on the phenomenon of “juramentado”, loosely translated as “running amock” in the perception of the Spaniards and the Americans, respectively, as an act of sacrifice in defense of Islam and the community of faithfuls.
Towards the close of the 19th Century, the Sultanates (the political institution of the Muslims in the Philippines) were considerably weakened by the long-drawn wars and were hardly in a position to keep up with the defenses against foreign incursions. There were compromises and concessions at this ebbing point that were regarded by the people as an abandonment of the responsibility on the part of the sultan to protect the community. It then became an individual obligation to ward off the presence of the foreigners and in most cases it ended up with a personal appointment with death, something that is believed to be recompensed with paradise for facing up to the agression of the non-believers. Quite a number of these juramentados became legendary, inspiring each generation on what it takes to have faith and to remain faithful to history.
The juramentado phenomenon waned in time and the Americans pursued an education campaign for the Muslims. They believed that through education a change could be expected from the Muslims, that is, pacified in the manner the rest of the Filipinos were successfully molded in the ways of western culture. The members of the royalty were the principal targest of the American educational campaign. Pangian Tarhata Kiram, a princess and heir to the Sulu Sultanate, was sent to the United States for schooling. In the United States she was fashioned as an American as she could be. When she came home, she spat the bubble gum and again picked up the habit of chewing bettle nut. It did seem to the princess that to swallow the ways of the “white men” was to betray her own roots.
In the changing economic, political and social structure brought about by the dominance of the Filipino order, the Muslims were gradually encouraged to get an education as a survival measure. The Philippine government seized the opportunity and intensified its programs on educating the Muslims especially in granting scholarships and other incentive benefits. While children of most of the well-to-do families enrolled in this program, majority of the poor population kept out of school. However, no sooner, attration to education reached its point of dissatisfaction. Some Muslim intellectuals and political leaders had uneasiness over the contents of the curriculum, suspicious above all of what harm it could inflict on the coming generations as to their existence and identity, and above all, their being Muslims.
Where the institution of the juramentado provided a cross-over in the defense of the Muslim communities after the demise of the sultanate, the birth of the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) may be regarded as a cross-over of the former. In summary, the MNLF’s peace negotiation with the Philippine government triggered a successive line of crossover defense with the declaration of “jihad” by the MILF and the yet confused but real threat of the Abu Sayyaf. The pattern of resistance that has emerged from the centuries of conflict may became all the more visibly clear in the future given the consistency in the perception and understanding of the problem. The events following the disintegration of Russia and Yugoslavia put in parallel perspective the context within which the Muslim situation in the Philippines could take a turn.
Consistently, the prevailing view on the Muslim problem is influenced by dominant modern day thoughts on economics wherein human existence is subjected to pure function of material progress. The establishment of the ARMM, the SZOPAD, the integration of former MNLF forces into the Philippine Armed Forces, are directed towards teh quantified satisfaction of a problem that has antedated contemporary governments and lifestyles.
Though the pangs of poverty contribute to social unrest, there is still much to human aspirations aside from basic needs for survival. This is a crucial point in which the Muslim communities in the Philippines have been struggling to strike a balance between the “passions of the earth and the desires of heaven”, so to speak. Every amount of rehabilitation and reconstruction funds for the development of Muslim Mindanao has come to naught in pacifying the conflict situation for the simple reason of lack of appreciation of the Weltanschauung of the Muslims by the national polity.
The quantified understanding of life is insisted by virtue of its being functional to the majority, that is, the larger Christian population. The saying, “a sauce for the goose is the sauce for the gander” appears to be the solution relentlessly pursued since it logically fits into the mold of what constitutes territorial integrity, the meaning of sovereignty, the supremacy of the constitution, one language to stand for a nation, and the definition of democracy as a rule by the majority.
Majority-Minority: Setting the right equation
It is to be noted that in the 1996 Peace Agreement, in the operations of the SZOPAD, in the socio-economic upliftment of the Southern Philippines, the thrusts of government programs and projects and those of donor countries encompass the non-Muslims (Christians that include the Lumads - natives). It is to be noted, too, that the conflict in the South concerns the plight of the Muslims who have been long neglected and long been discriminated. In short, this is a minority problem. It is thus to be treated as such in a manner that the solution addresses primarily the concerns of the Muslims without prejudice to the Christians in the area who already belong to the majority in the first place. It is a situation in which the majority (the national government) is offering assistance to the minority not only in terms of development projects but more importantly the means and the opportunities for empowerment to rise to the level of competitiveness with the majority. In a sense, it is to establish a right equation in the majority-minority relationship. Sadly, this is not what is happening in the South: the equation is kept lopsided. So the problem persists more to the liking of the solutions being undertaken. One Muslim Filipino writer puts this in a perspective: “The development and peace for Muslim is an offering, a gift by the majority to the minority: it is in bad taste when the majority still gets a share of its own gift.”
For the moment, the country’s political leadership disallows any change or modification in what it perceives as a “dismemberment” of the Philippine Republic. As if this is not enough, it imposes homogeneity of the Filipinos as a nation in spite of the existence of multi-cultural and multi-religious communities, which altogether prove the contrary. Nowhere does this come closer to the truth with the plight of the Muslims.
Given the position and the disposition of the Philippine government vis-a-vis the Muslims in the country, the present conflict in Muslim Mindanao is essentially a direct statement on how colonial relations have persisted into the modern times. The claim of the Muslim political groups for independence could only be the most viable option to break away from such a relationship. On the one hand, the acceptance of the Muslim political leadership, particularly the MNLF, and the ongoing peace negotiations with the MILF for autonomy is strongly indicative of how they could allow their existence within the territorial integrity of the country provided they exercise control over their lives as well as their destiny. Thus, independence is perceived by the Muslims as a matter of substance in opposition to the government’s political definition of it, that is, the existence of another state.
There are a number of governments that have intermittently confronted problems on minorities and have resolved or contained them in the course of time. But where there is the problem on Muslims as the minority, the issue dies hard. Not only does the problem involve religious sensitivities but more importantly on the reconciliation of two systems of law – one that is secular oriented and the other immutably sacred. And in the Philippine situation, the meaning of territorial integrity and sovereignty leaves no room for another system of law such as the Shari’ah. Just like autonomy, the incorporation of the Muslim Personal and Family Law into the Philippine Law serves only to reinforce the sovereignty of the latter. This is the main point of conflict, and resiliency of both sides could only serve to induce and sustain a breaking point with violence.
Altering the Equation: Encounter of Civilizations
During the height of the Muslim armed struggle under the Marcos era, a part of the major counter-insurgency steps taken was the acknowledgement of Islam as national heritage, an indispensable element in the search for national identity and nation-building. There was likewise a heightened consciousness regarding the Muslims not just as mere numerical entities but warmly qualified as being significant minority. What could have been a fresh look at Muslim-Christian relationships was marred by the fact that the advocate of such a radical view was no less unacceptable than the idea itself. It was all too difficult to go along with the policy Marcos was espousing at that time, as he was having an acute contradiction in his delusions to hold on to power. Besides, while the recognition of Islam and the role of Muslims in Philippine history, past and present, stood on good merits, they were only good in serving the ends of the military campaign against the Muslim armed struggle. And like the rest of the projects and programs on making up for neglect of the Muslim communities, the idea just died out to insignificance.
Perhaps, what had been initiated by Marcos propagandists on Islam and the Muslims may be reconsidered under the present situation. To a large extent, the idea succeeded in becalming the storms of war and appealed to most of the educated, leaders, and professionals among the Muslims who were convinced of the kind of justice that has finally come around. Though there may have been some lessons learned from the “tricks” of the Martial Law period, the idea itself holds a great amount of truth in rendering a finer perspective on the status of the Muslims in the country.
As the military options, going hand in hand with impact development projects, have not resolved entirely the Muslim problem, it becomes a challenge to take on “the road less travelled”. And since approaches and methods are consequent of perceptions and attitudes, it is thus quite an exercise of objectivity to take into account rethinking or re-feeling of the matter at hand as the first of the imperatives in the efforts to find a lasting and comprehensive resolution to the Mindanao conflict.
In consideration of the foregoing proposition, what is necessary is to take a bold step in challenging the traditional view that Islam is a mere punctuation in the pages of Philippine history. Despite the earlier contacts of the natives with Islam of more than two hundred years prior to the coming of the Europeans, there is little said and the least of appreciation on its contribution to the making of a civilization in this part of the world. Indeed, it is sad to note that even the most respected Filipino scholars and historians have one page to tell of Islam that is often dismissed as an accident of the historical forces, bestowing as it were greater importance to more ancient religious experiences in the Indo-Malaysian world.
The conflict situation in Muslim Mindanao is proof of how Islam has come to seal the social transformation of the people who have accepted it as a reference point in their lives. To view Islam as a mere event in the unfolding of human history through time is to take on a perspective that it could be relegated to the past and may only be considered in as far as it serves the interests of the present disposition.
It is often said that Islam is “a way of life”. It is a popularly accepted description but hardly understood. “A way of life” is taken to mean as valid and as applicable to other modes of living and understanding life. It is suggestive of the possibility that Islam could somehow be altered in time. This is not hypothetical nor a presumption. Efforts have been undertaken to introduce such change in Islam. But recent events in the Muslim world have proved that Islam possesses a quality of permanence and by this token it directs or determines the dynamics of history, rather than be swept away and buried in the layers of human existence.
By “way of life” carries with it the notion of Islam as a “civilizing force” that is universal in time and place. The restlessness of Muslim communities throughout the world particularly in the Southern Philippines is borne by the immutable Islamic principles on the kind of civilization that needs to be created in the contemporary context.
The tensions, violent and destructive as they have been, underlie the basic failure in appreciating Islam as the normative element of culture and civilization. This may also be the situation in which non-Muslim societies find themselves in, as they inter-relate with other communities, especially with the Muslims. In this manner, the common ground of the encounter is forced upon religion wherein even the commonalities are in themselves a cause for the differences. This is not to say, however, that such efforts at inter-faith dialogue is short of the measure in forging better understanding and goodwill among the religious communities. On the contrary, this is a major factor in considering a more constructive encounter, that is, on the level of culture or civilization. On this level, the experience could dwell on a synthesis of new ideas, of alternatives in technologies that secure the development of mankind in an atmosphere of peaceful co-existence and cooperation. The Golden Age of Islam in the Middle Ages has attained this level. There is optimism on a similar level of encounter as the quest for world peace and security continues.
In the Philippines, the challenge lies not in integration of a minority into the mainstream life of the majority. It is to effect a synthesis, of acknowledging the element of Islam in the evolution of the Filipino identity and a national spirit and the crucial role of the Muslims in the struggle to keep the freedom of every Filipino.
This may be an idea that may take a long way to realize, but as civilization is a manifestation of the peak of human perfection, all roads will lead ultimately towards this destiny.
(http://www.philsol.nl/A01a/Jumaani-redefining-oct00.htm)
MILF Buffer Force ‘professionalism’ hailed
The buffer force of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) known as the Joint Ceasefire Monitoring Elements (JCME) was commended by the Joint Government Republic of the Philippines (GRP) - MILF Coordinating Committees on the Cessation of Hostilities (CCCH) and by the Malaysian-led International Monitoring Team (IMT). The Joint CCCH and IMT gave credence to the neutrality, objectivity and professionalism exemplified by the JCMEs in the wake of the series of sporadic fighting between the combined forces of the 64th Infantry Battalion of the Philippine Army and paramilitary units against some elements of the 105th Base Command of the Bangsamoro Islamic Armed Forces (BIAF) – MILF.
The JCMEs is a peace keeping force set up by the Joint GRP – MILF CCCH and IMT in the Salbu, Datu Unsay Municipality; Pagatin, Datu Saudi Municipality, Mamasapano Municipality: and Shariff Aguak Municipality (SPMS) Area to help pacify and neutralize the confrontational situation between the government forces and the MILF forces.
In the series of sporadic encounters for the past two weeks that took place in the SPMS Area between the contending forces, the JCMEs were attacked several times by the government forces using 105 howitzers, mortars and assault rifles. But the JCMEs never reacted to those aggressive attacks by the government forces.
During the attack of the government forces last November 13, 2006, the positions of the JCMEs were fired upon for more that an hour by the elements of the 64th IB and paramilitary units by assorted high powered assault firearms.
Four JCME members were almost hit by the firing of the government forces. Worst, civilians were almost hit by the indiscriminate firing of the government forces. Three 81mm mortars also fell within the area of responsibility of the JCMEs, one of which was merely 30 meters away from their positions.
The sporadic fighting between the contending forces were all government-instigated encounters as all the area of engagement were within the identified positions and communities of the MILF fighters.
However, the IMT lamented over the involvement of the Buffer Forces Armed Forces of the Philippines which are supposedly designated as Peace Keeping Force in the SPMS Area.
The MILF CCCH considers the attack against the JCMEs by the government as a direct attack to the GRP – MILF CCCH and the IMT.
The 64th IB under its Commanding Officer Lt Col Roseller Murillo is designated as AFP Buffer Force purposely to help bring about peace and order in the area. However, no less than LT Col Murillo who admitted to have ordered the firing of the 64th IB its 105 howitzers and mortars against the MILF.
Meanwhile, the MILF CCCH and the IMT has recommended the replacement of 64th IB by another AFP on the ground of its continuing involvement in the clashes and direct violations of the GRP – MILF ceasefire accord. (http://www.luwaran.com/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=84)
The JCMEs is a peace keeping force set up by the Joint GRP – MILF CCCH and IMT in the Salbu, Datu Unsay Municipality; Pagatin, Datu Saudi Municipality, Mamasapano Municipality: and Shariff Aguak Municipality (SPMS) Area to help pacify and neutralize the confrontational situation between the government forces and the MILF forces.
In the series of sporadic encounters for the past two weeks that took place in the SPMS Area between the contending forces, the JCMEs were attacked several times by the government forces using 105 howitzers, mortars and assault rifles. But the JCMEs never reacted to those aggressive attacks by the government forces.
During the attack of the government forces last November 13, 2006, the positions of the JCMEs were fired upon for more that an hour by the elements of the 64th IB and paramilitary units by assorted high powered assault firearms.
Four JCME members were almost hit by the firing of the government forces. Worst, civilians were almost hit by the indiscriminate firing of the government forces. Three 81mm mortars also fell within the area of responsibility of the JCMEs, one of which was merely 30 meters away from their positions.
The sporadic fighting between the contending forces were all government-instigated encounters as all the area of engagement were within the identified positions and communities of the MILF fighters.
However, the IMT lamented over the involvement of the Buffer Forces Armed Forces of the Philippines which are supposedly designated as Peace Keeping Force in the SPMS Area.
The MILF CCCH considers the attack against the JCMEs by the government as a direct attack to the GRP – MILF CCCH and the IMT.
The 64th IB under its Commanding Officer Lt Col Roseller Murillo is designated as AFP Buffer Force purposely to help bring about peace and order in the area. However, no less than LT Col Murillo who admitted to have ordered the firing of the 64th IB its 105 howitzers and mortars against the MILF.
Meanwhile, the MILF CCCH and the IMT has recommended the replacement of 64th IB by another AFP on the ground of its continuing involvement in the clashes and direct violations of the GRP – MILF ceasefire accord. (http://www.luwaran.com/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=84)
Four centuries of jihad underpinning the Bangsamoro Muslims' struggle for freedom
Written by Robert Maulana Alonto
The struggle of the Malay Bangsamoro people began almost 500 years ago, when Spain invaded the three independent Muslim principalities - the Sultanates of Sulu and Maguindanao, and the Confederated Sultanates of Ranao - which governed mainland Mindanao and the islands of Basilan, Sulu and Palawan. Mindanao and these islands today constitute what is known as the 'southern Philippines.' Islam had been here for some 200 years before the Spanish arrived.
Before their coming to the Philippine archipelago in 1521, the Christian Spaniards already harboured deep hatred and prejudice toward Islam and the Muslims, whom they called Moros (Moors), and who had ruled Spain for 700 years. Spanish Muslims were killed, expelled or forcibly converted to Christianity after Christians from northern Spain defeated Muslim rulers. The Spanish invasion of Mindanao and Sulu, and their attempts to subdue and colonize the Muslim Sultanates there, took place 29 years after the fall of Granada, the last Muslim State in the Iberian peninsula.
After subduing the non-Muslim Malay inhabitants of Luzon and Visayas and converting them to Catholic Christianity, Spanish colonialism turned its eyes on the Muslim kingdoms to the south. They first destroyed the Muslim principality of Manila, which was rules by Rajah Sulayman and was the only Muslim-ruled territory on the island of Luzon, and forced the surviving followers of the Rajah to embrace Catholicism. They then made Manila their capital in the Philippines. Luzon and Visayas were then consolidated under the Spanish crown, and named Las Islas de Filipinas or the Philippine Islands after the Spanish king at the time, Philip II.
Having successfully established pax hispaniola in Luzon and Visayas, the Spaniards invaded Mindanao and Sulu. But the Muslim kingdoms resisted the Spanish throughout the 350 years of Spanish colonial rule and the Spanish presence in Mindanao and Sulu was restricted to some coastal areas of Mindanao, where they established military bases. The war inflicted untold hardship on the Bangsamoro Muslims, who were subjected to persecution and genocide as the Spaniards attempted to eliminate the Islamic faith, just as they had in Spain. But the Bangsamoro Muslim kingdoms managed to survive, albeit at a high cost.
Meanwhile, the Christianized native Malays of Luzon and Visayas accepted Spanish colonial rule and helped the invaders with the same zeal shown by the Crusaders when they invaded Muslim Palestine. The Spaniards treated these Christians as 'allies' and 'friends', while the Bangsamoro Muslims were enemies who had to be exterminated. An intense hatred for anything Muslim permeated the very core of Spanish-created Filipino society, to the extent that in their literature and arts the Muslim Moro is always depicted as the villain. This psychological enmity for the Bangsamoro Muslims which the Spaniards implanted in the minds of the Christianized Filipinos in the north lives to this day.
When the Spanish-American War broke out over Cuba in 1898, the Bangsamoro Muslim sultanates, whose allegiance was to the Uthmaniyyah Khilafat in Istanbul, were still largely in control of their respective domains. But the arrival of a new imperial power, the USA, ushered in a new phase in the Bangsamoro people's struggle. After defeating Spain, the US took over many of the former's colonial possessions, among them the Philippines. It was during American rule that the annexation of the Bangsamoro homeland into the Philippine nation-state system was secured.
While Catholic Spain had been driven by the spirit of the Inquisition, America was inspired by the unholy doctrines of 'Manifest Destiny' to bring the 'blessings' of western civilization to these 'barbarians' in Southeast Asia. But the Moro 'barbarians', much to the Americans' surprise, were not easily subdued. For another 50 years, the Bangsamoro Muslims fiercely resisted US rule, even though their antiquated weapons - the Malay kris, and flintlock rifles and obsolete canons captured from the Spaniards - were no match for the machine-guns and artillery of the Americans. Even Filipino and American historians agree that the Muslims of Mindanao and Sulu proved the hardest to defeat during the American occupation of the Philippines. One such encounter led to the martyrdom of the Sultan of Bayang, ruler of one of the Ranao sultanates, his entire family, and all his warriors. In emulation of the shahadah of Imam Husain at Karbala, the Sultan fought the American Army to the last man inside his kuta (fort), in what is now known among the Muslims here as 'padang Karbala.' The Bangsamoro mujahideen took it as a personal duty to Allah to continue to fight to the death, even if a Muslim leader surrendered. It became common for a lone Muslim mujahid to attack American soldiers and camps, killing many of them before losing his life. The Spanish and Americans disparagingly called this act juramentado or amok; Muslims refer to this as sabil or prang sabil, from the Arabic jihad fi sabilillah.
In 1941, US's rule of the Philippines was interrupted by the Second World War. The Japanese Imperial Army invaded and drove off the mighty US forces from the islands. The Bangsamoro people now fought the Japanese invaders. Six months before US forces led by general Douglas MacArthur landed in Leyte to retake the Philippines, the Muslim territories in Mindanao were already free of the Japanese. US rule was eventually re-instated in the Philippines when the Japanese were driven out in 1945.
By this time, the Muslim sultanates were much weakened - militarily and economically - by more than three centuries of intense war. Organized military resistance was broken by the militarily superior Americans, who now tried a policy of seduction. Many Muslim leaders fell for this trick and ended up collaborating with the Americans. The Bangsamoro masses nevertheless pursued their resistance in many ways, and supported Muslims who continued to defy American rule through guerrilla warfare. A major part of the US strategy was the opening of Mindanao to Christian Filipino settlers from Luzon and Visayas. This became a priority of the US-created Philippine Commonwealth government under the puppet presidency of Manuel L. Quezon. When the US finally 'granted' independence to the Philippines on July 4, 1946, the Bangsamoro homeland was officially annexed to the new Philippine Republic despite vehement protests from Bangsamoro leaders and the masses. The US and their Filipino surrogates based the validity of Moro annexation on the 1898 Treaty of Paris. But the Bangsamoro people regarded the Treaty of Paris as a transaction between two thieves, and also argued that the terms of the treaty did not apply to them as the Bangsamoro homeland had never been subjugated by the Spaniards. Unfortunately, the decrepit Uthmaniyyah khilafah, with which the Muslims had identified, had already been buried by Turkish nationalists, and the rest of the Islamic Ummah was also under the western imperial control. Thus it was that the Bangsamoro people and their homeland were handed over to the Filipinos, who had inherited the intense psychological, cultural and religious enmity for Muslims of their erstwhile Spanish masters.
Under Philippine rule, the Bangsamoro people were treated like a subjugated people. Forced to attend Philippine government and Catholic-run schools, Muslim youths were taught that their forefathers were lawless people who loved war and resisted modern civilization and development. The natural resources of the homeland were expropriated by the Filipino descendants of those collaborators from Luzon and Visayas who rowed the Spanish war galleys on their way to fight the Muslims in Mindanao. And while forcible conversion to Christianity was avoided, Muslims were compelled to study religion (Catholicism) in schools as part of the curriculum. In jobs, Christians were given preference. Representation in the national government is marginal and - with very few exceptions - only those Muslims who have totally embraced the government's policy of assimilation have been appointed to senior positions under the Filipino rulers.
Meanwhile in Mindanao, state-backed terrorism against Muslim communities was the order of the day. In 1969-71, before the declaration of martial law by the regime of Ferdinand Marcos, the wholesale burning of Muslim homes, mosques and madaris was almost a daily occurrence. Muslim farms and plantations were targeted for looting and destruction. Government-backed paramilitary gangs and armed Christian fanatics called Ilagas - or rats - massacred Muslim civilians, the young, the old and the women. Muslim villages, towns and farmlands were cleared, to be taken over by Filipino Christians. An estimated 50,000 Muslims all over Mindanao were killed during this pre-martial law period. Yet the Philippine government denies that these pogroms ever occurred, let alone that it had any complicity in them. In February 1973, just months after martial law had been declared by Marcos on November 21, 1972, Bangsamoro Muslims were finally able to fight back as an organized armed revolutionary movement - the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF). Although the MNLF was a strange mix of Islam and Moro nationalism, the Bangsamoro Muslims rallied under its revolutionary banner and fought the Philippine establishment as a unified force. The main call then was to defend Islam and regain Moro freedom.
From 1972 until the signing of the Tripoli Agreement between the MNLF and the Philippine government in 1976, which led to a cease-fire, an estimated 150,000 Muslims were killed, more than 500,000 were forced to seek refuge in Sabah, Malaysia, and more than one million were rendered homeless and destitute in the homeland. The devastation of the Bangsamoro homeland was staggering. But it was at this time that the Bangsamoro people and their revolutionary leaders decided that the only solution to what the government called 'the Mindanao Problem' was to regain their independence from the Philippine nation-State system.
After the Bangsamoro revolution erupted in the 1970s, there were many attempts by the Manila regime to pacify the angry Muslim masses but there was no sincere effort to solve the problem. The issue of independence was ignored, while strategies designed to perpetuate Philippine colonial rule were promoted. Unfortunately, the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC), which took great interest in the issue at this time, accepted the deceptions that the Philippine government presented as solutions, and helped persuade the MNLF to abandon their goal of independence in favour of autonomy. This betrayal of Bangsamoro aspirations exposed both the duplicity of the Philippine government and the impotence of the OIC.
The MNLF lost the momentum gained at the start of the revolution and in due course the support of the Bangsamoro Muslim masses. Morale within the MNLF itself began to wither, leading to the surrender of many of its top leaders and military commanders. In 1996, Nur Misuari, chairman of the MNLF, surrendered to the Philippine government and accepted the governorship of the so-called Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM). This capitulation was brokered by Indonesia, a prominent OIC member-State. However, what appeared to be a tragedy was a blessing in disguise. From where the secularist leadership of the MNLF left off, revolutionary ulama and Islamic intellectuals of the Bangsamoro emerged to lead the final stage of the Bangsamoro struggle for freedom: the Islamic stage. The Islamic movement has defined and refined the goal of the Bangsamoro struggle. Bangsamoro freedom now mean not only independence from the Philippine nation-State system but freedom to establish an Islamic State and government in the Bangsamoro homeland. This new vision has been wholeheartedly embraced by the Bangsamoro people, whose faith, culture, history, psychology and identity as a people have all been shaped by Islam and their Islamic heritage.
The emergence of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) from the defunct MNLF, and the flowering of other Islamic revolutionary groups such as the Abu Sayyaf Group and the Islamic Command Council, are proof of this. The Islamic stage in the Bangsamoro struggle now takes the form of the Islamic revolution which today has awakened the Ummah on the one hand and has shaken the world of kufr on the other. In December 3-5, 1996, the Bangsamoro people convened the Bangsamoro People's Consultative Assembly in Sultan Kudarat, Maguindanao Province to take a position on the 'Mindanao Problem'. The assembly was attended by 1,070,697 delegates from all over Mindanao, Basilan, Sulu and Tawi-Tawi. The resolutions presented by the provincial and sectoral delegations were unanimous in declaring that the only just, viable and lasting solution to the 'Mindanao Problem' is the establishment of an independent Islamic State.
(http://www.muslimedia.com/ARCHIVES/sea99/phil-jihad.htm)
The struggle of the Malay Bangsamoro people began almost 500 years ago, when Spain invaded the three independent Muslim principalities - the Sultanates of Sulu and Maguindanao, and the Confederated Sultanates of Ranao - which governed mainland Mindanao and the islands of Basilan, Sulu and Palawan. Mindanao and these islands today constitute what is known as the 'southern Philippines.' Islam had been here for some 200 years before the Spanish arrived.
Before their coming to the Philippine archipelago in 1521, the Christian Spaniards already harboured deep hatred and prejudice toward Islam and the Muslims, whom they called Moros (Moors), and who had ruled Spain for 700 years. Spanish Muslims were killed, expelled or forcibly converted to Christianity after Christians from northern Spain defeated Muslim rulers. The Spanish invasion of Mindanao and Sulu, and their attempts to subdue and colonize the Muslim Sultanates there, took place 29 years after the fall of Granada, the last Muslim State in the Iberian peninsula.
After subduing the non-Muslim Malay inhabitants of Luzon and Visayas and converting them to Catholic Christianity, Spanish colonialism turned its eyes on the Muslim kingdoms to the south. They first destroyed the Muslim principality of Manila, which was rules by Rajah Sulayman and was the only Muslim-ruled territory on the island of Luzon, and forced the surviving followers of the Rajah to embrace Catholicism. They then made Manila their capital in the Philippines. Luzon and Visayas were then consolidated under the Spanish crown, and named Las Islas de Filipinas or the Philippine Islands after the Spanish king at the time, Philip II.
Having successfully established pax hispaniola in Luzon and Visayas, the Spaniards invaded Mindanao and Sulu. But the Muslim kingdoms resisted the Spanish throughout the 350 years of Spanish colonial rule and the Spanish presence in Mindanao and Sulu was restricted to some coastal areas of Mindanao, where they established military bases. The war inflicted untold hardship on the Bangsamoro Muslims, who were subjected to persecution and genocide as the Spaniards attempted to eliminate the Islamic faith, just as they had in Spain. But the Bangsamoro Muslim kingdoms managed to survive, albeit at a high cost.
Meanwhile, the Christianized native Malays of Luzon and Visayas accepted Spanish colonial rule and helped the invaders with the same zeal shown by the Crusaders when they invaded Muslim Palestine. The Spaniards treated these Christians as 'allies' and 'friends', while the Bangsamoro Muslims were enemies who had to be exterminated. An intense hatred for anything Muslim permeated the very core of Spanish-created Filipino society, to the extent that in their literature and arts the Muslim Moro is always depicted as the villain. This psychological enmity for the Bangsamoro Muslims which the Spaniards implanted in the minds of the Christianized Filipinos in the north lives to this day.
When the Spanish-American War broke out over Cuba in 1898, the Bangsamoro Muslim sultanates, whose allegiance was to the Uthmaniyyah Khilafat in Istanbul, were still largely in control of their respective domains. But the arrival of a new imperial power, the USA, ushered in a new phase in the Bangsamoro people's struggle. After defeating Spain, the US took over many of the former's colonial possessions, among them the Philippines. It was during American rule that the annexation of the Bangsamoro homeland into the Philippine nation-state system was secured.
While Catholic Spain had been driven by the spirit of the Inquisition, America was inspired by the unholy doctrines of 'Manifest Destiny' to bring the 'blessings' of western civilization to these 'barbarians' in Southeast Asia. But the Moro 'barbarians', much to the Americans' surprise, were not easily subdued. For another 50 years, the Bangsamoro Muslims fiercely resisted US rule, even though their antiquated weapons - the Malay kris, and flintlock rifles and obsolete canons captured from the Spaniards - were no match for the machine-guns and artillery of the Americans. Even Filipino and American historians agree that the Muslims of Mindanao and Sulu proved the hardest to defeat during the American occupation of the Philippines. One such encounter led to the martyrdom of the Sultan of Bayang, ruler of one of the Ranao sultanates, his entire family, and all his warriors. In emulation of the shahadah of Imam Husain at Karbala, the Sultan fought the American Army to the last man inside his kuta (fort), in what is now known among the Muslims here as 'padang Karbala.' The Bangsamoro mujahideen took it as a personal duty to Allah to continue to fight to the death, even if a Muslim leader surrendered. It became common for a lone Muslim mujahid to attack American soldiers and camps, killing many of them before losing his life. The Spanish and Americans disparagingly called this act juramentado or amok; Muslims refer to this as sabil or prang sabil, from the Arabic jihad fi sabilillah.
In 1941, US's rule of the Philippines was interrupted by the Second World War. The Japanese Imperial Army invaded and drove off the mighty US forces from the islands. The Bangsamoro people now fought the Japanese invaders. Six months before US forces led by general Douglas MacArthur landed in Leyte to retake the Philippines, the Muslim territories in Mindanao were already free of the Japanese. US rule was eventually re-instated in the Philippines when the Japanese were driven out in 1945.
By this time, the Muslim sultanates were much weakened - militarily and economically - by more than three centuries of intense war. Organized military resistance was broken by the militarily superior Americans, who now tried a policy of seduction. Many Muslim leaders fell for this trick and ended up collaborating with the Americans. The Bangsamoro masses nevertheless pursued their resistance in many ways, and supported Muslims who continued to defy American rule through guerrilla warfare. A major part of the US strategy was the opening of Mindanao to Christian Filipino settlers from Luzon and Visayas. This became a priority of the US-created Philippine Commonwealth government under the puppet presidency of Manuel L. Quezon. When the US finally 'granted' independence to the Philippines on July 4, 1946, the Bangsamoro homeland was officially annexed to the new Philippine Republic despite vehement protests from Bangsamoro leaders and the masses. The US and their Filipino surrogates based the validity of Moro annexation on the 1898 Treaty of Paris. But the Bangsamoro people regarded the Treaty of Paris as a transaction between two thieves, and also argued that the terms of the treaty did not apply to them as the Bangsamoro homeland had never been subjugated by the Spaniards. Unfortunately, the decrepit Uthmaniyyah khilafah, with which the Muslims had identified, had already been buried by Turkish nationalists, and the rest of the Islamic Ummah was also under the western imperial control. Thus it was that the Bangsamoro people and their homeland were handed over to the Filipinos, who had inherited the intense psychological, cultural and religious enmity for Muslims of their erstwhile Spanish masters.
Under Philippine rule, the Bangsamoro people were treated like a subjugated people. Forced to attend Philippine government and Catholic-run schools, Muslim youths were taught that their forefathers were lawless people who loved war and resisted modern civilization and development. The natural resources of the homeland were expropriated by the Filipino descendants of those collaborators from Luzon and Visayas who rowed the Spanish war galleys on their way to fight the Muslims in Mindanao. And while forcible conversion to Christianity was avoided, Muslims were compelled to study religion (Catholicism) in schools as part of the curriculum. In jobs, Christians were given preference. Representation in the national government is marginal and - with very few exceptions - only those Muslims who have totally embraced the government's policy of assimilation have been appointed to senior positions under the Filipino rulers.
Meanwhile in Mindanao, state-backed terrorism against Muslim communities was the order of the day. In 1969-71, before the declaration of martial law by the regime of Ferdinand Marcos, the wholesale burning of Muslim homes, mosques and madaris was almost a daily occurrence. Muslim farms and plantations were targeted for looting and destruction. Government-backed paramilitary gangs and armed Christian fanatics called Ilagas - or rats - massacred Muslim civilians, the young, the old and the women. Muslim villages, towns and farmlands were cleared, to be taken over by Filipino Christians. An estimated 50,000 Muslims all over Mindanao were killed during this pre-martial law period. Yet the Philippine government denies that these pogroms ever occurred, let alone that it had any complicity in them. In February 1973, just months after martial law had been declared by Marcos on November 21, 1972, Bangsamoro Muslims were finally able to fight back as an organized armed revolutionary movement - the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF). Although the MNLF was a strange mix of Islam and Moro nationalism, the Bangsamoro Muslims rallied under its revolutionary banner and fought the Philippine establishment as a unified force. The main call then was to defend Islam and regain Moro freedom.
From 1972 until the signing of the Tripoli Agreement between the MNLF and the Philippine government in 1976, which led to a cease-fire, an estimated 150,000 Muslims were killed, more than 500,000 were forced to seek refuge in Sabah, Malaysia, and more than one million were rendered homeless and destitute in the homeland. The devastation of the Bangsamoro homeland was staggering. But it was at this time that the Bangsamoro people and their revolutionary leaders decided that the only solution to what the government called 'the Mindanao Problem' was to regain their independence from the Philippine nation-State system.
After the Bangsamoro revolution erupted in the 1970s, there were many attempts by the Manila regime to pacify the angry Muslim masses but there was no sincere effort to solve the problem. The issue of independence was ignored, while strategies designed to perpetuate Philippine colonial rule were promoted. Unfortunately, the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC), which took great interest in the issue at this time, accepted the deceptions that the Philippine government presented as solutions, and helped persuade the MNLF to abandon their goal of independence in favour of autonomy. This betrayal of Bangsamoro aspirations exposed both the duplicity of the Philippine government and the impotence of the OIC.
The MNLF lost the momentum gained at the start of the revolution and in due course the support of the Bangsamoro Muslim masses. Morale within the MNLF itself began to wither, leading to the surrender of many of its top leaders and military commanders. In 1996, Nur Misuari, chairman of the MNLF, surrendered to the Philippine government and accepted the governorship of the so-called Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM). This capitulation was brokered by Indonesia, a prominent OIC member-State. However, what appeared to be a tragedy was a blessing in disguise. From where the secularist leadership of the MNLF left off, revolutionary ulama and Islamic intellectuals of the Bangsamoro emerged to lead the final stage of the Bangsamoro struggle for freedom: the Islamic stage. The Islamic movement has defined and refined the goal of the Bangsamoro struggle. Bangsamoro freedom now mean not only independence from the Philippine nation-State system but freedom to establish an Islamic State and government in the Bangsamoro homeland. This new vision has been wholeheartedly embraced by the Bangsamoro people, whose faith, culture, history, psychology and identity as a people have all been shaped by Islam and their Islamic heritage.
The emergence of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) from the defunct MNLF, and the flowering of other Islamic revolutionary groups such as the Abu Sayyaf Group and the Islamic Command Council, are proof of this. The Islamic stage in the Bangsamoro struggle now takes the form of the Islamic revolution which today has awakened the Ummah on the one hand and has shaken the world of kufr on the other. In December 3-5, 1996, the Bangsamoro people convened the Bangsamoro People's Consultative Assembly in Sultan Kudarat, Maguindanao Province to take a position on the 'Mindanao Problem'. The assembly was attended by 1,070,697 delegates from all over Mindanao, Basilan, Sulu and Tawi-Tawi. The resolutions presented by the provincial and sectoral delegations were unanimous in declaring that the only just, viable and lasting solution to the 'Mindanao Problem' is the establishment of an independent Islamic State.
(http://www.muslimedia.com/ARCHIVES/sea99/phil-jihad.htm)
Monday, November 13, 2006
MILF scoffs at low-level truce
A commander of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) told newsmen yesterday who went up to his mountain base that there is no truth to reports floating in Iligan City and Lanao Del Norte that he had agreed to sign a tripartite low-level truce involving the MILF, MNLF, and Army commanders. Bravo Macapaar, a veteran of the 2000 all-out war declared by Estrada, told Luwaran that the report is totally baseless and a mere imagination of those who wish to destroy his name. “There is really no need for that truce, because the MILF has existing ceasefire agreement with the government,” he explained, even as he also scored at one so-called non-government organizations (NGOs) operating in the province as partly to be blame for this black propaganda.
He also said there is no need to sign a truce with the MNLF, saying the MILF is not at war at them.
“They are our brothers, “he stressed, adding, however, that the MNLF should polish their ranks because some of their elements are being used by a powerful politician in Davao City , who is serving the government, to justify getting of funds from foreign donors.
Actually the all-out war against the MILF was declared in Kauswagan, Lanao Del Norte by President Estrada after his godson, 1st Lt. Don Alfonso Javier, was slain in battle against MILF forces on March 16, 2000 in Inudaran, the same town and province.
One report said that the young Army lieutenant, who had just graduated from the Philippine Military Academy in Baguio City , was actually Estrada’s own son by a mistress. Estrada is a compulsive womanizer.
Estrada was ousted from power in January 2001. (www.luwaran.com)
He also said there is no need to sign a truce with the MNLF, saying the MILF is not at war at them.
“They are our brothers, “he stressed, adding, however, that the MNLF should polish their ranks because some of their elements are being used by a powerful politician in Davao City , who is serving the government, to justify getting of funds from foreign donors.
Actually the all-out war against the MILF was declared in Kauswagan, Lanao Del Norte by President Estrada after his godson, 1st Lt. Don Alfonso Javier, was slain in battle against MILF forces on March 16, 2000 in Inudaran, the same town and province.
One report said that the young Army lieutenant, who had just graduated from the Philippine Military Academy in Baguio City , was actually Estrada’s own son by a mistress. Estrada is a compulsive womanizer.
Estrada was ousted from power in January 2001. (www.luwaran.com)
Sunday, November 12, 2006
MILF receives GRP proposal on territory
The Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), through its chief peace negotiator Mohagher Iqbal, has confirmed that it has already received from the Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP) a new proposal on the strand on territory in the ancestral domain aspect of the on-going peace talks.
Asked about the contents of the GRP proposal, Iqbal said, "they just enlarge the ring". He did not elaborate, however.
The proposal was contained in a letter signed by government chief peace negotiator, Sec. Silvestre Afable Jr., to his counterpart in the MILF, Iqbal, dated November 9. The letter, pursuant to established protocol, passed through the Malaysian government before the MILF received it.
The MILF objected to earlier government proposal that any additional area to the present jurisdiction of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) can only be made possible through “constitutional process”.
The MILF described the offer as “conditional”, which trapped the MNLF when it agreed to such phrase in the GRP-MNLF Final Peace Agreement of 1996.
The MILF pursues the political line that it is better to have no agreement at all than by signing a bad agreement. Moreover, none of the MILF leaders especially in the central committee expressed any desire to serve the proposed Bangsamoro Juridical Entity (BJE) in any capacity. This is a reversed situation from that of the MNLF whose leaders scrambled to have seat in the ARMM or any position in the government. With reports from www.luwaran.com)
Asked about the contents of the GRP proposal, Iqbal said, "they just enlarge the ring". He did not elaborate, however.
The proposal was contained in a letter signed by government chief peace negotiator, Sec. Silvestre Afable Jr., to his counterpart in the MILF, Iqbal, dated November 9. The letter, pursuant to established protocol, passed through the Malaysian government before the MILF received it.
The MILF objected to earlier government proposal that any additional area to the present jurisdiction of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) can only be made possible through “constitutional process”.
The MILF described the offer as “conditional”, which trapped the MNLF when it agreed to such phrase in the GRP-MNLF Final Peace Agreement of 1996.
The MILF pursues the political line that it is better to have no agreement at all than by signing a bad agreement. Moreover, none of the MILF leaders especially in the central committee expressed any desire to serve the proposed Bangsamoro Juridical Entity (BJE) in any capacity. This is a reversed situation from that of the MNLF whose leaders scrambled to have seat in the ARMM or any position in the government. With reports from www.luwaran.com)
Philippine government drops murder charges vs MILF chair
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